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INTRODUCTION
Medical malpractice “certificate of merit” statutes are pieces of state
legislation designed to reduce frivolous malpractice lawsuits and asso1
ciated costs. Although the statutes vary in the requirements they place
on litigants and in the breadth of lawsuits to which they apply, they all
require the plaintiff in a malpractice action to consult with an expert
2
either before the suit is filed or within a fixed period of time thereafter.
This Comment addresses whether, under the Erie doctrine, these
statutes are applicable in federal court. It then considers the policy
implications of the answer. This Comment concludes that the statutes
3
are not applicable in federal court. A faithful application of Hanna
and its progeny—including the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
1

See, e.g., State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 502 (Colo. 2000) (stating that the purpose
of a state’s certificate of merit statute is to ensure that the expert “has concluded that
the plaintiff’s claim is meritorious,” thereby “‘avoiding unnecessary time and costs in
defending professional negligence claims [and] weeding out frivolous claims’” (quoting Shelton v. Penrose/St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 984 P.2d 623, 628 (Colo. 1999));
Bell v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 614 S.E.2d 115, 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that statute’s goal is “to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits”).
2
For a broad discussion of certificate of merit statutes, see generally 2 STEVEN E.
PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 9:1 (3d ed. 2005), Karen Lerner,
‘Junk Lawsuits’? Tinkering with the Tort Laws, MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY, March
2003, at 1, and Jefferey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to
Special Certificates of Merit?, 1997 BYU L. REV. 537.
3
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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4

Shady Grove —shows that the vast majority of the statutes conflict with
one or more of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The few that are
not clearly in conflict are not outcome determinative when that test is
applied as Hanna instructs. As to the policy question, this Comment
observes that Hanna tends to require the subordination in federal
court of certain state laws designed to regulate specific areas of policy.
Questioning whether reform is needed to provide greater protection,
this Comment analyzes both radical and moderate suggestions for reforming the Erie doctrine, incorporating where appropriate the three
main viewpoints represented in Shady Grove. The policy discussion
concludes by analyzing how a moderate adjustment to Hanna might
affect the certificate of merit issue.
Part I contains a brief discussion of the timeliness of this issue, followed by an overview of the statutes currently enacted, a survey of past
decisions, and a review of other scholarly works. In order to determine whether these statutes conflict with the Federal Rules, Section
II.A analyzes the decisions in which the Supreme Court has indicated
whether or not a state statute and a Federal Rule conflict. To the extent possible, that Section extracts the legal principles animating
those decisions and uses them as a framework to analyze whether various state statutes conflict with Rules 8, 9, 11, 12, 26, and 37. Concluding that conflicts do exist, the discussion in Section II.A points out errors in the reasoning of the courts that have concluded otherwise.
Section II.B discusses the modified outcome determination test and
how its application reveals a paradox built into Hanna, which favors
the application of federal law. Part III discusses policy implications.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevance to Health Care Reform
The debate on health care reform culminating in the March 2010
5
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act gave new
prominence to certificate of merit statutes. As proponents and opponents of medical malpractice reform debated the virtues of various
6
reform proposals, the certificate of merit garnered national attention

4

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
6
See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. H12,963-67 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (debating medical
malpractice reform proposals contained in the Republican motion to recommit the Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009)).
5
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as a type of malpractice reform that was less controversial than limiting damages or attorneys’ fees.
In July of 2009, during a markup of an early version of the health
care reform bill, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce approved an amendment offered by Representative Bart Gordon en7
couraging states to implement certificate of merit legislation. The
amendment created an incentive-payment program to reward states
8
for implementing certain kinds of medical liability reform. Under
the amendment as passed by the Committee, Congress would have
been authorized to appropriate funds that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services could then distribute to states whose malpractice
reform programs were “effective” and in compliance with the
9
amendment’s guidelines. Those guidelines allowed incentive payments to be made if a state enacted certificate of merit laws, early offer
10
laws, or both.
During President Obama’s ultimately fruitless attempt to win Republican support for health care reform, he stated to a joint session of
Congress in September 2009 that he would instruct the Department of
Health and Human Services to begin immediately providing incentives for states that implemented appropriate medical malpractice
11
reform proposals, rather than wait for the passage of a final bill.
White House officials specifically indicated that eligible state legislation could include laws implementing expert-certificate require12
They further indicated that Representative Gordon’s
ments.
13
amendment was “a model for what Obama has in mind.”

7

See Markup of H.R. 3200 Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong.
(2009) (amendment offered by Reps. Bart Gordon, Nathan Deal, and Jim Matheson).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. Early offer laws allow a defendant to offer a malpractice plaintiff a settlement covering economic damages and modest attorneys’ fees within a set period after
the filing of the complaint. If the plaintiff rejects the offer, she will later be subject to a
heightened burden of proof at trial. See generally Joni Hersch et al., An Empirical Assessment of Early Offer Reform for Medical Malpractice, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S231, S256 (2007)
(finding that early offer programs can furnish a variety of benefits, such as expedited
payments and reduced litigation costs); Jeffrey O’Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Offers as a Simple, if Second-Best, Alternative to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858, 866
(1999) (describing the impediments faced by plaintiffs who decline early offers).
11
See Amy Goldstein, On Malpractice Reform, Fine Print Is Still Hazy, WASH. POST,
Sept. 11, 2009, at A7 (reporting on President Obama’s desire for states to experiment
with reforms that reduce the costs of medical malpractice litigation).
12
Id.
13
Id.
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Although the House of Representatives subsequently passed the
14
Gordon amendment as part of a larger health care reform bill, the
specific bill into which the amendment was incorporated was not the
15
final bill that the President ultimately signed into law. President Obama nonetheless delivered on his promise to create an incentive program without waiting for specific congressional approval. On October
20, 2009, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, a division
of the Department of Health and Human Services, released a Request
16
for Applications detailing the grant program. The program offered
up to $3 million per state (up to a total of $21 million for the entire
program) for the implementation of current or future medical liability models that, among other things, reduce both “the incidence of fri17
volous lawsuits and liability premiums.” An Administration fact sheet
confirmed that this grant program corresponded to the initiative that
18
the President had mentioned to Congress. Recent national atten14

Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 2531 (as
passed by House, Nov. 7, 2009). This version of the Gordon amendment required
that, in addition to enacting either a certificate of merit requirement or early offer requirement, to be eligible, the state law could not limit attorneys’ fees or damages. Id.
§ 2531(a)(4). However, the efficacy of this limitation was undermined by subsection
(a)(5), which explained that an eligible state could still limit fees or damages, as long
as the law doing so “is not established or implemented as part of the” same law implementing certificates of merit or early offers. Id. § 2531(a)(5)(C).
15
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 10607,
§ 399V-4, 125 Stat. 119, 1009-14 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15). This
bill did authorize a broader incentive program to provide further funding to states that
develop and implement “alternatives to current tort litigation” for resolving medical
malpractice disputes. Id. § 399V-4(a). However, the program would seem to exclude
mandatory certificate of merit statutes because of its requirement that any program
receiving funding “provide[] patients the ability to opt out of or voluntarily withdraw
from participating in the alternative at any time.” Id. § 399V-4(c)(2)(G). Moreover, a
mandatory certificate of merit statute might conflict with the statute’s requirement that
any program receiving funding cannot “limit or curtail” a patient’s “ability to file a
claim.” Id. § 399V-4(c)(2)(I). But see COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE ET AL., 111TH
CONG., HR 3962, THE AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR AMERICA ACT SECTION-BYSECTION ANALYSIS 45 (considering certificate of merit statutes to fit within the definition of the term “medical liability alternatives” for the purposes of an earlier version of
health care reform).
16
See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., RFA-HS-10-021, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS (2009) (instituting a grant program for states and health care systems willing to undertake reforms), available at http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/guide/
rfa-files/RFA-HS-10-021.html.
17
Id.
18
See Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Patient Safety and Medical
Liability Reform Demonstration (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://healthreform.gov/
newsroom/factsheet/medicalliability.html (quoting President Obama’s September
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tion, along with an Obama Administration–provided stamp of federal
approval, make an analysis of the applicability of certificate of merit
statutes in federal court relevant and timely.
B. Survey of Statutes
State certificate of merit statutes vary widely in their exact provisions. For instance, some are limited to medical negligence while
19
others cover other types of professional negligence as well. For the
purposes of this discussion, however, it is useful to categorize them
into three rough groups.
The first category consists of statutes that require the attorney,
when filing the complaint, to certify that she has consulted with an
expert and that the expert has indicated that the claim has at least a
reasonable chance of being meritorious. For instance, Florida’s statute asserts that
[n]o action shall be filed for personal injury or wrongful death arising out
of medical negligence, whether in tort or in contract, unless the attorney
filing the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the
circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief
that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.
The complaint or initial pleading shall contain a certificate of counsel
that such reasonable investigation gave rise to a good faith belief that
grounds exist for an action against each named defendant. For purposes
of this section, good faith may be shown to exist if the claimant or his or
her counsel has received a written opinion, which shall not be subject to
discovery by an opposing party, of an expert as defined in s. 766.102 that
20
there appears to be evidence of medical negligence.

Other states with statutes falling into this category include Minnesota,
21
Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.
The second category consists of statutes that require the attorney
to file a certificate or affidavit from the expert herself, rather than a
certificate merely verifying that a consultation has occurred. For ex-

2009 congressional address and explaining that the demonstration initiative was implemented “[a]s directed by President Obama”).
19
Compare FLA. STAT. § 766.104 (2010) (requiring certificates of merit only in
medical negligence actions), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2008) (requiring a
“certificate of review” in any action “based upon the alleged professional negligence of
an acupuncturist . . . or a licensed professional”).
20
FLA. STAT. § 766.104.
21
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (West
2008); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 r. 9(j) (2007);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 19 (Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-122 (Supp. 2009).
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ample, Ohio’s Rule of Civil Procedure 10(D) requires that the complaint in any medical negligence claim include one or more “affidavits
22
of merit” per defendant. Each affidavit must include
(i) [a] statement that the affiant has reviewed all medical records reasonably available to the plaintiff concerning the allegations contained in
the complaint;
(ii) [a] statement that the affiant is familiar with the applicable standard
of care;
(iii) [t]he opinion of the affiant that the standard of care was breached
by one or more of the defendants to the action and that the breach
23
caused injury to the plaintiff.

Other states that employ or have employed a similar approach include
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, South
24
Carolina, and Washington.
The third category consists of statutes that require the filing of
certificates or affidavits similar to those in the first two categories;
however, rather than mandating that plaintiffs file certificates with the
complaint, these statutes require the certificate to be filed within a set
period of time after the complaint. For instance, New Jersey’s statute
requires that
[i]n any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or
property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff
shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer to the
complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of
an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability
that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment,
practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside accept25
able professional or occupational standards or treatment practices.

22

OHIO R. CIV. P. 10(D).
Id.
24
See C ONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a (West Supp. 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6853 (Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-622 (West Supp. 2009), invalidated by Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930
N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912d (West 2000); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.071 (LexisNexis 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-100 (Supp.
2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.150 (2007), invalidated by Putman v. Wenatchee Med.
Ctr., 216 P.3d 374, 377-79 (Wash. 2009) (holding that statute restricted access to
courts, violated separation of powers by intruding upon the Washington Supreme
Court’s constitutional power to promulgate procedural rules, and conflicted with state
procedural rules concerning pleadings and verifications).
25
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 2010).
23
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States with similar statutes include Arkansas, Colorado, Maryland, Mis26
souri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
In addition to these three categories, there are a few other note27
worthy variations among certificate of merit statutes. A number of
states require that the affidavit or certificate contain a significant description of the operative facts and theories employed by the consulted expert in reaching her opinion. For instance, Georgia’s statute
requires that the affidavit “set forth specifically at least one negligent
act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such
28
claim.” Texas’s statute goes as far as to require that, within 120 days
of filing a malpractice complaint, the plaintiff produce at least one de29
tailed expert report for every physician-defendant in the case.
Another important distinction among the various statutes lies in the
repercussions for noncompliance or compliance in bad faith. The
penalties for not adhering to a certificate of merit statute include dis30
31
missal without prejudice, dismissal with prejudice, awarding attor32
33
neys’ fees to defendants, sanctions for the attorney, and even discip34
linary proceedings with the state bar association.
26

See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-114-209 (2006), partially invalidated by Summerville v.
Thrower, 253 S.W.3d 415, 420-21 (Ark. 2007) (holding subsection (b)(3)(a), which
calls for dismissal of the action if the affidavit is not filed within thirty days of the complaint, unconstitutional because it conflicted with Arkansas Rule 3, which governs the
commencement of actions, and thereby intruded upon state supreme court’s constitutional power to make court procedural rules); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2008);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 538.225 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (Supp. 2009); 231 PA. CODE § 1042.3
(2008), TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West Supp. 2009). But see W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (LexisNexis 2008) (requiring plaintiffs to produce “screening
certificate[s] of merit” at least thirty days before complaint is filed).
27
This paragraph focuses on variations that have a direct bearing on whether the
statutes are enforceable in federal court. There are, of course, other important variations that will not be discussed in this Comment. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52190a (West Supp. 2009) (allowing a court to extend the relevant statute of limitations if
necessary to allow plaintiff time to comply with the “certificate of good faith” statute).
28
GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2008).
29
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
30
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 19(A)(2) (Supp. 2009) (“If the civil action
for professional negligence is filed . . . without an affidavit being attached to the petition . . . the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss the action without prejudice to its refiling.”).
31
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 2005) (“Failure to comply with subdivision 2, clause (1), within 60 days after demand for the affidavit results, upon motion, in mandatory dismissal with prejudice of each cause of action as to which expert
testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie case.”).
32
See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West Supp. 2009) (establishing that if an expert report is not filed, the court should enter an order that
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All together, this Comment has identified at least twenty-five states
35
that have enacted certificate of merit statutes. These include states
in ten of the eleven numbered Circuits; cumulatively, these states
36
represent well over sixty percent of the United States’ population.
C. Relevance in Federal Court
Certificate of merit statutes can become relevant whenever state
malpractice law provides the rule of decision in federal court. Because there is no general federal malpractice cause of action, any
medical negligence case in federal court will employ state medical
37
negligence law. Medical negligence actions arrive in federal court
38
under three different scenarios: diversity cases, federal question
39
cases in which a state malpractice claim is pendent to the federal
40
claim, and malpractice claims against the federal government arising

“awards to the affected physician or health care provider reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs of court incurred by the physician or health care provider”).
33
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209(a) (2006) (allowing “appropriate sanctions” in the case of noncompliance).
34
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.104 (2010) (declaring that if the attorney did not file
in good faith, “the court shall award attorney’s fees and taxable costs against claimant’s
counsel, and shall submit the matter to The Florida Bar for disciplinary review of the
attorney”).
35
See supra notes 20-26.
36
See United States 2009 Population Estimates by State, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://factfinder.census.gov (follow “Population Finder” hyperlink; then follow “Alphabetic” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
37
From January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2008, 1126 complaints containing a
medical malpractice claim were filed in federal court. See Personal Injury—Medical Malpractice Cases Filed Between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008, JUSTIA.COM,
http://dockets.justia.com/search?nos=362&after=2008-01-01&before=2008-12-31 (last
visited Sept. 15, 2010) (listing results of an online docket search).
38
See, e.g., Baird v. Celis, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (applying state
malpractice law in a claim brought by an Alabama resident against a hospital in Georgia).
39
When a district court exercises pendent jurisdiction over state claims pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, it applies state law as if deciding a diversity case. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (“[W]hen a federal court exercises diversity or pendent
jurisdiction over state-law claims, ‘the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.’” (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945))).
40
Litigants attach state medical malpractice complaints to claims arising under
several federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Patient AntiDumping Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). See, e.g., Hunter v. Amin, 583 F.3d 486, 488
(7th Cir. 2009) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Palmer v. Hosp. Auth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1561-62 (11th
Cir. 1994) (Federal Patient Anti-Dumping Act).
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under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Cases brought under
any of these three scenarios can result in consideration of the applicability of certificate of merit statutes.
D. Past Decisions
Two circuit courts have considered the Erie implications of certificate of merit statutes, both ruling that such statutes were applicable in
federal court. In Chamberlain v. Giampapa, the Third Circuit held that
42
New Jersey’s affidavit of merit statute was applicable in federal court.
The Tenth Circuit, in Trierweiler v. Croxton and Trench Holding Corp., similarly held that Colorado’s certificate of review statute was applicable
43
44
in federal court. Additionally, two circuits, the Eighth and the Ele45
venth (in a nonprecedential opinion), have affirmed decisions in
which the statutes were applied, but the Erie issue was not considered.
41

28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680. Although the policy considerations that animate rule-of-decision jurisprudence are different for claims brought under the FTCA,
some federal courts apply the Erie doctrine. See, e.g., Seery v. United States, No. 98-0671,
2001 WL 34368387, at *1 (D. Del. May 1, 2001) (citing Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210
F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000)(citing a Third Circuit diversity analysis of New Jersey’s certificate of merit statute to support the proposition that “the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit
Statute is substantive state law that should be applied to FTCA actions”); see also Daniel v.
United States, No. 09-2371, 2010 WL 481267, at *2-4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2010) (using Erie
analysis to determine the applicable law in FTCA claims); Rahimi v. United States, 474 F.
Supp. 2d 825, 827-29 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (same); Straley v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 728,
734-37 (D.N.J. 1995) (same); cf., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (holding
that district courts presiding over FTCA actions should apply the “whole law” of the forum state). But see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 553 (1951) (clarifying
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure always apply in FTCA actions).
Federal courts that import an Erie analysis into FTCA cases are probably ruling incorrectly. See Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Adams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49
U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 978 n.129 (1988) (“The states are never offended by the use of
federal procedure in cases involving the [FTCA], as they are not perceived as state-law
matters, and the concern over forum shopping is not as relevant as it is in Erie because
there is no comparable case that is only capable of being brought in state court.”).
Nevertheless, to the extent that federal courts do apply Erie in FTCA contexts, those
cases are relevant to this Comment.
42
210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000).
43
90 F.3d 1523, 1538-41 (10th Cir. 1996).
44
See Weasel v. St. Alexius Med. Ctr., 230 F.3d 348, 352 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming
the dismissal of a medical malpractice claim for failure to comply with North Dakota’s
expert-affidavit statute without considering whether the law is applicable in federal
court).
45
See Johnson v. McNeil, 278 Fed. App’x 866, 871-72 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding
the dismissal of a negligence action for failure to comply with Florida’s presuit requirements for medical malpractice claims without questioning whether the statute applies in
federal court). According to Eleventh Circuit rules, this opinion does not create binding
precedent. See 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 (considering unpublished opinions nonbinding).

GROSSBERG_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform

11/18/2010 9:55 AM

227

Although these affirmations suggest implicit approval by those courts,
when the Eleventh Circuit previously considered the issue directly, it
suggested in dicta that it might find Georgia’s statute to be applicable
46
in federal court.
One reason for the lack of settled appellate law is that Erie issues at
47
the pleading stage are generally not appealed.
In most states, a
plaintiff who fails to file a certificate of merit will be given a second
chance. Assuming the plaintiff is then able to fulfill the requirements
of the statute, she may never have a reason to appeal the prior ruling.
If, on the other hand, a defendant fails to convince a district court
that the plaintiff must file a certificate, she probably cannot imme48
diately appeal the court’s ruling. Even if the defendant loses the
case, the court’s ruling on the certificate of merit is unlikely to consti49
tute reversible error. Given the limited space available in a federal
50
appellate brief, defendants focus their efforts elsewhere.
At the district court level, the picture becomes murkier. While a
majority of courts appear to have concluded that the statutes are ap51
plicable, a strong minority has ruled that they are not. Of the courts
that have concluded that the statutes are applicable, some have given
only cursory analysis. For instance, in Finnegan v. University of Rochester
Medical Center, the court briefly cited some nonbinding precedent and
then summarily concluded, “I agree with these cases that a state statute requiring a certificate of merit is substantive law that applies in a
52
federal diversity action.” Moreover, a majority or near majority of

46

See Brown v. Nichols, 8 F.3d 770, 773-74 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that plaintiff’s
complaint would have been sufficiently pled under either Rule 8 or Georgia’s statute).
47
Cf. Richard Henry Seamon, An Erie Obstacle to State Tort Reform, 43 IDAHO L. REV.
37, 86-88 (2006) (explaining that the applicability in federal court of state statutes restricting the pleading of punitive damages is an issue that tends to avoid appellate review).
48
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006) (setting forth the narrow circumstances under
which interlocutory appeals are granted).
49
Cf. infra text accompanying notes 233-36 (explaining why nonenforcement of a
certificate of merit statute at the trial court level is unlikely to alter the ultimate outcome of a case).
50
See FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7) (limiting appellant’s principal brief to either 14,000
words or approximate equivalents in pages and lines).
51
Compare Smith v. Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, 225 F.R.D. 233,
242 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (applying Missouri’s health care affidavit statute), with Long v.
Adams, 411 F. Supp. 2d 701, 709 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (refusing to apply Michigan’s affidavit of merit requirement in a diversity malpractice suit).
52
180 F.R.D. 247, 249 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
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55

federal courts in Georgia, Texas, and Florida have determined
that their state statutes are not applicable in federal court. While the
decisional material suggests that most courts consider the statutes to
apply in federal court, the picture is far from clear.
It is possible that the outcomes of the decided cases are skewed by
the quality of representation. Caution dictates that more competent
plaintiffs’ attorneys would file a certificate of merit if there were even
a possibility that a judge might determine that failure to do so would
be grounds for dismissal. Indeed, if most plaintiffs’ attorneys voluntarily submit the certificates in federal court, it might predispose judges
to assume that the statutes must apply there. This raises questions
about the competance of counsel who decide not to file certificates
and who consequently are the same attorneys who will be making the
Erie argument to courts.
E. Other Scholarly Work
There is a small body of scholarly work addressing the applicabili56
ty of certificate of merit statutes in federal court. There is, however,
no recent, comprehensive analysis of the problem. Some of the ar57
ticles focus on the statute of only one state. Other articles are limited in analytical scope, focusing chiefly on the conflict between the
various statutes and Federal Rules 8, 9 and 11, to the exclusion of oth58
er relevant Rules, including 26 and 37. Lastly, at the time of writing,
53

See Denton v. United States, No. 04-3285, 2006 WL 358273, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb.
15, 2006) (“[C]ourts in this district have previously held that Georgia’s expert-affidavit
requirement contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 does not apply in diversity actions filed
in federal district courts.”).
54
See Guzman v. Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., No. 07-3973, 2008 WL 5273713, at
*15 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2008) (listing extensive decisional law to support the proposition that federal courts in Texas do not apply Texas’s expert-report statute).
55
See, e.g., Braddock v. Orlando Reg’l Health Care Sys., 881 F. Supp. 580, 584 (M.D.
Fla. 1995) (holding that Florida’s expert-affidavit statute directly conflicts with Rule 8).
56
Interestingly, in contrast to majority of the judicial decisions on this topic suggesting that certificate of merit statutes should apply in federal court, the scholarly material overwhelmingly suggests that they should not.
57
See, e.g., Dace A. Caldwell, Comment, Civil Procedure: Medical Malpractice Gets Eerie: The Erie Implications of a Heightened Pleading Burden in Oklahoma, 57 OKLA. L. REV.
977 (2004); Robert K. Harris, Case Comment, Brown v. Nichols: The Eleventh Circuit
Refuses to Play the Erie Game with Georgia’s Expert Affidavit Requirement, 29 GA. L. REV. 291
(1994); Melinda L. Stroub, Note, The Unforeseen Creation of a Procedural Minefield—New
Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit Statute Spurs Litigation and Expense in Its Interpretation and Application, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 279, 290 n.61 (2002).
58
See Jeffrey A. Parness et al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading
Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV. 412, 431-33 (1999) (discussing cases that considered if state sta-
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no work has been done on the applicability of certificate of merit statutes in federal court since the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady
59
Grove, its most recent Erie case, or even since its decisions in Twombly
60
and Iqbal, cases that have fundamentally altered the meaning of
61
Rule 8. In light of the shortcomings of prior work, the still-unsettled
nature of the question, and the newfound prominence of the issue in
the context of health care reform, the issue is ripe for further exploration.
II. THE ERIE ANALYSIS
Courts determine whether state laws should be enforced in federal court by applying the Erie doctrine. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
established the basic proposition that federal courts sitting in diversity
62
must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York instructed lower courts to distinguish between substance and procedure in the Erie context by applying an outcome63
determination test.
The Court enunciated the framework for its modern Erie jurispru64
dence in Hanna v. Plumer. Hanna established two separate prongs

tutes requiring special pleading of medical malpractice claims conflict with federal
pleading requirements); Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain
Solution to the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct
About Special Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 971, 1003-20 (2005) (explaining
why state statutes imposing heightened pleading standards on medical malpractice
claims conflict with the notice pleading regime established by the Federal Rules); Harris, supra note 57, at 301-07 (concluding that Georgia’s expert-affidavit requirement
conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 11, and 15).
59
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
60
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
61
Cf. Penrose & Caldwell, supra note 58, at 999 (arguing that certificate of merit
statutes conflict with the Federal Rules because “[i]n 1957, 1993, and 2002, the Supreme Court evaluated the issue of heightened pleadings and, in each instance, rebuffed attempts to incorporate any heightened pleading requirement into Rule 8”).
62
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (“The
broad command of Erie was . . . [that] federal courts are to apply state substantive law
and federal procedural law.”).
63
See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“In essence, the intent of
[Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation
in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”).
64
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465-74. For a discussion of the development of the Erie
doctrine through Hanna, see John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 693 (1974), and Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to be Applied in Diversity

GROSSBERG_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

11/18/2010 9:55 AM

230

[Vol. 159: 217

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

for analyzing Erie questions: a first prong for areas where a valid Federal Rule or federal statute is directly on point and a second prong
where no Rule or statute covers the issue in dispute and only federal
common law stands in opposition to the application of the state law in
65
question. In the case of a controlling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, promulgated by the Supreme Court with Congress’s acquiescence, the Court ruled that only the Constitution and the Rules
66
Enabling Act establish limitations on the Rule’s enforceability. As
long as the Rule does not exceed the power granted to the courts by
either the Constitution or the Rules Enabling Act, federal courts will
enforce it over a conflicting state law, even if this might yield a differ67
ent outcome in litigation.
When there is no controlling Federal Rule or statute on point,
Hanna’s second prong instructs courts to answer the substance/procedure question by applying an outcome-determination
68
test. However, Hanna tempered York’s outcome-determination test.

Cases: A Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Problems,
163 F.R.D. 19 (1995).
65
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469-71 (distinguishing between situations in which state
law applies because no Federal Rule covers the point in dispute and those in which a
Federal Rule controls the issue, displacing conflicting state laws).
66
See id. at 463-64 (concluding that, because Rule 4(d)(1) is valid pursuant to
both the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act, it controls).
67
See id. at 472-74 (“To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to
function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’
attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.”). A Rule is valid under the Rules
Enabling Act as long as it does not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and its progeny, the Court explained that this limitation permits any rule that “really regulates procedure,—the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law.” 312
U.S. 1, 14 (1941); accord Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1442 (2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.)
(“We have long held that this limitation means that the Rule must ‘really regulat[e]
procedure, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them . . . .’” (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14)). For further discussion of the validity of
the Sibbach test following Shady Grove, see infra note 256.
68
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465-67, 470-74 (asserting that the outcome-determination
test applies in those cases where “no Federal Rule . . . cover[s] the point in dispute”).
Interestingly, the Court characterizes both the test to determine validity under the
Rules Enabling Act and the outcome-determination test as tests that distinguish between substance and procedure, even though those two tests can yield different results.
See id. at 470-71 (“It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly,
that federal courts are to apply state ‘substantive’ law and federal ‘procedural’
law . . . .”). For a discussion of the shifting line between substance and procedure in
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First, Hanna warned courts not to apply the test syllogistically. The
Court explained that any state procedural law not followed by a litigant in federal court can seem outcome determinative if its application in federal court means the litigant loses, whereas refusal to apply
69
Instead, the Hanna Court exit means the litigation continues.
plained, lower courts should apply the outcome-determination test
with “reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
70
Although later cases have refined the meaning of the Sulaws.”
preme Court’s Erie jurisprudence, Hanna still provides the basic
framework by which federal courts must analyze the applicability of
certificate of merit statutes.
A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Hanna’s First Prong
1. Determining Whether There Is a Controlling
Federal Enactment on Point
Analyzing a potential conflict under the first prong of Hanna requires a determination of whether the state law conflicts with any of
71
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Supreme Court
has never found that a Federal Rule violates the Constitution or goes
72
beyond the limits set by the Rules Enabling Act, the crucial analysis
in Hanna’s first prong is determining whether the Federal Rule in
73
question is broad enough to control the situation.
the context of Hanna, see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1027-35 (1982), and Ely, supra note 64, at 718-38.
69
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468-69; see also A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 356 (2007) (criticizing York’s outcome-determination test
by suggesting that “all legal rules have the potential to impact the outcome of a case”).
70
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
71
For discussions of the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see generally 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 124.03 (3d ed. 2007);
19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4510 (2d ed.
1996); Ides, supra note 64, at 61-67.
72
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1030, at 166-67 (3d ed. 2002). See also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010) (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J.,
Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.) (“[W]e have rejected every statutory challenge to a
Federal Rule that has come before us.”).
73
It is important to note that in recent years, most notably in Semtek, the Court has
resorted to strained, narrow interpretations of the Federal Rules in order to avoid
Enabling Act challenges. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497,
505-06 (2001) (holding that although Rule 41(b) deems an involuntary dismissal under its terms to be an “adjudication on the merits,” that term confers no preclusive ef-
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In Hanna, the Supreme Court contrasted the supposed simplicity of
74
this step with the “relatively unguided Erie choice.” However, defining
when a Federal Rule is coextensive with state law to the point that the
Federal Rule controls is, in reality, a difficult and abstract question. Although the Supreme Court has provided some guidance, it is the ambiguity of this question that leads to discord among courts and scholars as
to whether certificate of merit statutes are applicable in federal court.
To construct a general framework for determining when a Federal Rule
and state law conflict, it makes sense to study the line of Supreme Court
cases analyzing this question in an attempt to form the most cohesive
set of principles possible.
Prior to Hanna, the Supreme Court had never explicitly declared
that a valid Federal Rule always trumps state law with which it is suffi75
ciently coextensive. In Hanna, the plaintiff served the executor of
the defendant’s estate by leaving copies of the summons and com76
plaint with the executor’s wife at his residence. This service was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4(d)(1), which allows service to be made by leaving copies at the defendant’s “dwelling house
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discre77
tion then residing therein.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff had failed to adhere to a Massachusetts statute requiring in-hand service for the
78
The Supreme Court concluded that as to
executor of an estate.
these two enactments, “the clash is unavoidable; Rule 4(d)(1) says—
implicitly, but with unmistakable clarity—that in-hand service is not
79
required in federal courts.”

fect if a claim is brought in other districts); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum
Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1042-46 (2002) (explaining that the drafters of Rule 41(b) intended for the Rule to have preclusive effect
in other districts); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1150-52 (2002) (observing that in its
efforts to avoid Enabling Act challenges, the Court has shown a willingness to depart
“from a Rule’s text and Notes”); cf. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448-60 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (urging the Court to employ stricter scrutiny when evaluating the validity
of a Federal Rule under the Rules Enabling Act).
74
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
75
See Ides, supra note 64, at 34-55 (tracking doctrinal developments from Erie to
Hanna).
76
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 462.
79
Id. at 470.
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Hanna suggested that if the Federal Rules explicitly say that a given means (residential service) of accomplishing an end (notice) is sufficient, then it shall be sufficient even if a state statute requires more
rigorous means (in-hand service).
80
The next important case in this chain is Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.
In Walker, the Court held that Rule 3, which deems an action commenced when the plaintiff files her complaint with the court, did not
exclude the operation of an Oklahoma statute mandating that, for the
purpose of tolling a statute of limitations, an action is commenced
81
upon service of the summons to the defendant. The Court observed
that the “Hanna analysis” only occurs if there is a “‘direct collision’ be82
tween the Federal Rule and the state law.” The Court framed the
question by asking whether “the Federal Rule . . . is sufficiently broad
83
to control the issue before the Court.” However, the Court immediately softened that rule with a footnote instructing that “this is not to
suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly
construed in order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state law. The
84
Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning.”
In justifying its holding, the Court observed that there is nothing
to suggest that Rule 3 was intended to govern tolling of statutes or to
85
displace state laws governing that topic. The Court concluded that
80

446 U.S. 740 (1980).
See id. at 750-52 (describing the Federal Rule and state statute at issue to conclude that the latter applies in a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction). The
facts of this case were virtually indistinguishable from those of Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). The Court used Walker as an opportunity
to show that the pre-Hanna cases construing the Erie doctrine did indeed survive the
decision in Hanna. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749.
82
Walker, 446 U.S. at 749 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472). Walker credits Hanna
for the “direct collision” language. However, in Hanna, the Court uses “direct collision” to describe the type of cases that had not previously been decided in the Court’s
Erie jurisprudence. In Walker, “direct collision” explicitly becomes an affirmative requirement. Compare Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 (“[T]his Court has never before been confronted with a case where the applicable Federal Rule is in direct collision with the law
of the relevant State . . . .”), with Walker, 446 U.S. at 749 (“Application of the Hanna
analysis is premised on a ‘direct collision’ between the Federal Rule and the state law.”).
83
Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50.
84
Id. at 750 n.9.
85
Id. at 750-51 (“There is no indication that the Rule was intended to toll a state
statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace state tolling rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations.” (footnote ommitted)). The Court supported its
findings on the intent of Rule 3 by citing two sources: a section from Wright and Miller’s treatise, observing that Rule 3 does not explicitly state that it has a tolling effect,
and an Advisory Committee Note, stating that the answer to the question of whether
Rule 3 tolls a statute might turn on whether or not the Supreme Court can promulgate
81
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because Rule 3 and the Oklahoma statute serve different purposes and
are animated by different policies, they can “exist side by side . . . each
86
controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.”
At first glance, Hanna and Walker seem compatible. In Hanna, the
Federal Rules explicitly set forth the sufficiency requirements for service of process, whereas, in Walker, the unsuccessful petitioner attempted to take a Rule that governed when the internal clock of the
Federal Rules began running and apply it to toll a state statute of limitations. However, a tension appears between the two decisions in light
of scholarship observing that the Supreme Court in Hanna ignored
the First Circuit’s observation below that Massachusetts had its own
87
rule identical to Rule 4(d)(1) to govern service of process. The inhand requirement added by the Massachusetts statute was to ensure
that in the case of an executor, service was “‘sufficient to satisfy due
88
process requirements for in personam jurisdiction.’” In this light,
the cases seem to conflict. In both cases, the Federal Rule and the
state law seem to set the procedural requirements for accomplishing
the same thing (“service of process” in Hanna and “commencement of
the action” in Walker) but for different reasons.
Although a skeptic (and perhaps a realist) would explain the difference by pointing to the Court’s desire to use Hanna as an opportu89
nity to protect the uniformity of the Federal Rules, federal courts
must make a good-faith attempt to distinguish the two cases. That distinction is best stated as follows: while the Federal Rule and the state
law in Hanna may have been designed to accomplish different ultimate ends, within the context of the litigation they were both rules
governing the same procedural activity (service of process). On the
other hand, in Walker, the state law and Federal Rule only appeared to
govern the same thing (commencement of the action), when in actuality, they governed different procedural activities (the “various timing
rules that affect the functioning of statutes of limitations without simultaneously exceeding the limitations of the Rules Enabling Act. Id. at 750 n.10. The Court explained the relevance of the latter by observing that the Advisory Committee predicted
the problem without explicitly resolving it. Id.
86
Id. at 752.
87
See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 68, at 1173-76 (“The court of appeals’ gloss confirms what a fair reading of the statute as a whole suggests, namely that the [state] statutory provisions in question were the functional equivalent of a tolling rule.”).
88
Id. (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964), rev’d, 380 U.S.
460 (1965)).
89
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463 (“Because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of
federal procedure posed by the decision below, we granted certiorari.”); see also Burbank,
supra note 68, at 1176 (characterizing Hanna as “invoking a threat that did not exist”).
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90

requirements of the Federal Rules” versus the tolling of a state statute of limitations). This rather abstract distinction is more easily understood by examining what happens if a federal court gives effect to
the state laws in question. Enforcement of the Massachusetts statute
in federal court would rob Rule 4 of the ability to set the sufficiency
requirements for service of process in federal court. On the other
hand, enforcement in federal court of Oklahoma’s law requiring service of process in order to toll a statute of limitations does not undermine Rule 3’s ability to initiate the “various timing requirements of
the Federal Rules.” Thus the logical principles to extract from Walker
are the following: the Rules should be given their plain meaning, and
when a Federal Rule and a state statute appear to function similarly—
but govern entirely different procedural activities—a federal court
should allow them both to operate.
Seven years after Walker, the Court took a step toward a broader
reading of the Federal Rules in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v.
91
Woods. In Burlington Northern, the Eleventh Circuit, in accordance
with the mandates of an Alabama statute, had imposed a ten-percent
penalty on an appellant-defendant who had obtained a stay on judg92
ment and subsequently lost his appeal. The Court ruled that the Alabama statute was inapplicable in federal court because it conflicted
with Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which gives
93
judges the discretion to punish appellants who take frivolous appeals.
The Court’s reasoning is instructive for the task at hand. While
confirming that a “direct collision” between a Federal Rule and a state
statute was a sure sign that the Federal Rule, if valid, must prevail, the
Court also suggested that the Federal Rule prevails if it is “sufficiently
94
broad” that it “implicitly . . . ‘control[s] the issue’ before the court.”
The Court cited with approval and then applied two propositions
from an analogous Fifth Circuit case: first, the mandatory operation
of the state penalty statute interferes with “the discretionary mode of
operation of the Federal Rule”; and second, the Federal Rule punishes only frivolously taken appeals, whereas the state statute penalizes all
90

Walker, 446 U.S. at 751.
480 U.S. 1 (1987).
92
Id. at 2-3.
93
See id. at 7 (holding that because “the Rule’s discretionary mode of operation
unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision of Alabama’s affirmance penalty
statute,” the latter is precluded from application in federal diversity actions); see also
FED. R. APP. P. 38 (permitting a court of appeals to “award just damages and single or
double costs to the appellee” if it “determines that an appeal is frivolous”).
94
Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 4-5 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749).
91

GROSSBERG_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

11/18/2010 9:55 AM

236

[Vol. 159: 217

University of Pennsylvania Law Review
95

unsuccessful appellants. That both the Rule and statute serve the
same purpose (“compensate[ing] a victorious appellee for the lost use
of the judgment proceeds”) constituted a further indication that “the
Rule occupies the [Alabama] statute’s field of operation so as to prec96
lude its application in federal diversity actions.” It makes no difference, the Court added, that Alabama’s Rule 28, modeled after the
Federal Rules, is capable of operating side by side with its mandatory
97
penalty statute.
From Burlington Northern we can extract the principle that when
the Federal Rules leave a question to the discretion of the trial court,
state laws that interfere with that discretion will not be enforced.
Moreover, the decision suggests that when it comes to punishing misbehaving litigants, interfering with the Court’s ability not to punish is
grounds to refuse application of a state law in federal court.
The Supreme Court reinforced Burlington Northern’s holding in Ste98
wart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. Although Ricoh involved a federal
statute rather than a Court-promulgated rule, the “direct collision” step
99
of the analysis is the same. In Ricoh, the district court denied defendant’s 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion to transfer venue even though the
parties’ contract had a forum-selection clause requiring suits to proceed
100
in the target venue. The trial judge justified his ruling by explaining
101
that Alabama law looked unfavorably upon forum-selection clauses.
Notably, the Supreme Court dropped the “direct collision” language and clarified that the federal enactment governs if it is “‘suffi102
ciently broad to control the issue before the Court.’” The Court, citing Burlington Northern, ruled that the Alabama law disallowing forum-

95

See id. at 6-7 (invoking the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Affholder, Inc. v. Southern
Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1984)).
96
Id. at 7 & n.5.
97
Id. at 7-8.
98
487 U.S. 22 (1988).
99
See Ides, supra note 64, at 80 (describing the analysis for a Federal Rule and a
federal statute as “identical”).
100
Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 24-25.
101
Id. at 24.
102
Id. at 26 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50). As the Court explained,
[l]ogic indicates . . . that this language is not meant to mandate that federal
law and state law be perfectly coextensive and equally applicable to the issue at
hand; rather, the “direct collision” language, at least where the applicability of
a federal statute is at issue, expresses the requirement that the federal statute
be sufficiently broad to cover the point in dispute.
Id. at 26 n.4 (construing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965)).
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selection clauses could not be enforced in federal court, as it destroyed the discretion Congress gave judges in its enactment of the
103
The Court clarified that it did not matter if
venue transfer statute.
the policy concerns animating the Alabama law “are not perfectly
coextensive” with the policies that determine the factors the district
104
court considers when ruling on a motion to transfer venue.
Ricoh strengthened Burlington Northern’s holding. If the federal
enactment’s “‘discretionary mode of operation’ conflicts with the
nondiscretionary provision[s]” of state law, the federal enactment applies in diversity even if wholly different policy concerns animate the
105
state law.
Although the discretionary/mandatory core of the holdings in Ricoh and Burlington Northern remains undisturbed, after Ricoh
the Court’s Hanna jurisprudence began to focus on the question of
what role, if any, state policies had in determining whether a Federal
Rule and state law conflicted.
In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, a question arose concerning
the scope of Rule 59 in a case determining whether federal judges are
bound by New York’s “deviates materially” standard for granting new
106
trials in response to excessive jury verdicts.
Rule 59 allows a trial
judge to grant a new jury trial “for any reason for which a new trial has
107
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Citing
Burlington Northern, Justice Scalia argued in dissent that Rule 59 was
sufficiently broad to control the issue of when district courts can grant
108
He
new trials, thereby requiring that federal law control the issue.
further argued that the phrase “in the courts of the United States”
109
shows that a federal standard must apply.
By contrast, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion argued that
whether damages are excessive (a traditional reason for granting a
new trial) must be determined by some standard; a standard that the
Rules of Decision Act requires to be a state standard in state causes of
103

See id. at 31 (“Congress has directed that multiple considerations govern transfer within the federal court system, and a state policy focusing on a single concern or a
subset of the factors identified in § 1404(a) would defeat that command.”).
104
Id. at 30. But see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7
(1996) (observing, in dicta, that “[f]ederal courts have interpreted the Federal
Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies”).
105
Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 30 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7
(1987)).
106
518 U.S. 415, 420-22 (1996).
107
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A).
108
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109
Id. at 467-68.
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action.
Perhaps more important than the Court’s holding on
whether Rule 59 conflicted with the New York standard was the
Court’s characterization of the method for determining when a Federal Rule conflicts with state law. Justice Ginsburg, writing for a 5-4
majority, twice invoked avoidance of conflict with important state regulatory interests and policies as a major guidepost for federal courts
111
construing the breadth of the Federal Rules. Although there was little precedent establishing this as a major concern of the Hanna analy112
sis in the Supreme Court’s cases prior to Gasperini, Justice Ginsburg’s
110

See id. at 437 n.22 (majority opinion) (“Whether damages are excessive for the
claim-in-suit must be governed by some law. And there is no candidate for that governance other than the law that gives rise to the claim in relief—here, the law of New
York.” (citing Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (1994))); see also id. at
440 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Rule does state that new trials may be granted
‘for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at
law in the courts of the United States,’ but that hardly constitutes a command that federal courts must always substitute federal limits on the size of judgments for those set
by the several States in cases founded upon state-law causes of action.” (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 59)).
111
Id. at 427 n.7, 437 n.22 (majority opinion).
112
To support the majority’s assertion that a concern for state regulatory policies
played a major role in pre-Gasperini cases interpreting the Federal Rules, the Court
cited Walker, a case from the Seventh Circuit, and a federal courts casebook. Id. at 427
n.7 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-752 (1980), S.A. Healy Co.
v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310-312 (7th Cir. 1995), and RICHARD
H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 729-730 (4th ed. 1996)). Although Walker did examine the policies underpinning
the Oklahoma law in support of its determination that the state law was not coextensive with the Federal Rule, at no point did the Walker Court anoint protection of state
regulatory policies as a normative value in its own right for the purposes of the conflictanalysis step of Hanna. Walker, 446 U.S. at 751-52.
The Court’s citation of Healy also raises eyebrows. In Healy, Judge Posner observed
that there were two “pretty clear” classes of cases for the purposes of the Erie doctrine.
Healy, 60 F.3d at 310. First, the court rightly observed that if a state law conflicts with a
Federal Rule, it is easy to rule that the Federal Rule controls (assuming the Rule’s validity under the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act). Id. The second “pretty
clear” type of case occurs when “the state procedural rule, though undeniably ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of the term, is limited to a particular substantive area, such
as contract law.” Id. In this instance, the court opined, the state’s substantive intent is
“manifest” and the law must be enforced. Id. This second observation is much more
troublesome. First, there is nothing that guarantees that laws included in the second
class of “pretty clear” cases do not also conflict with the Federal Rules. In fact, that is
precisely the problem that certificate of merit statutes present. Second, even for state
laws that only fall in the second category of “pretty clear” cases, deciding their fate in
federal court by concluding that they are obviously evidence of the state’s manifest
substantive intent flouts Hanna’s instructions to analyze such laws by querying whether
they are outcome determinative with respect to the twin aims of Erie. Instead, it harkens back to a pre–Guaranty Trust method of resolving Erie questions by an intuitive
analysis of whether the law is substantive or procedural.
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opinion unequivocally listed it as a relevant factor. Therefore, Gasperini’s holding added to the doctrine that although a Federal Rule might
be sufficiently broad to control a situation, that Rule’s application may
implicitly involve the use of state laws. Its dicta added that it is important for federal courts to interpret Federal Rules “with sensitivity to im113
portant state interests and regulatory policies.”
The Court handed down its most recent gloss on Hanna in Shady
114
Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co. In Shady Grove, the
petitioner brought a diversity claim against Allstate for roughly fivehundred dollars in statutory interest that had accrued while Allstate
115
delayed payment of a claim. Admitting that the claim fell far short
of the amount-in-controversy requirement for individual diversity
116
claims, the petitioner attempted to certify its claim as a class ac117
tion, despite the fact that New York law forbids class certification in
118
actions involving this type of statutory penalty.
Both the trial court
and the Second Circuit rejected the petitioner’s argument that the
New York law conflicted with Rule 23, concluding that the state law
119
and the Federal Rule served different purposes.

Flaws in the reasoning of Healy aside, its use in Gasperini is also questionable. Although the parenthetical following the citation accurately summarizes the holding of
Healy, the case is cited to support the Court’s assertion that the federal courts interpret
the Rules “with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.” Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7. However, the portion of Healy that pays attention to state interests and regulatory policies is its description of the “second class of pretty easy cases.”
Healy, 60 F.3d at 310. When it came to interpreting a Federal Rule, as the Court’s parenthetical acknowledges, Healy merely held that Rule 68, which on its face only applies to offers by defendants, did not also apply to offers by plaintiffs. Id. Such a holding does not require particular sensitivity to state regulatory interests.
113
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7.
114
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
115
Id. at 1436-37.
116
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (requiring the amount in controversy to exceed
$75,000 for individual diversity claims in federal court).
117
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (granting to federal
district courts original jurisdiction over class actions in which there is minimum diversity
and the aggregate amount in controversy of all class claims exceeds $5 million).
118
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006)
(“Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery
specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be
maintained as a class action.”).
119
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; see also FED R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth requirements for bringing a class action in federal court).
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With a 5-4 majority representing Chief Justice Roberts, Justice So120
tomayor, and the still-sitting dissenters from Gasperini, the Court reversed, concluding that Rule 23’s language—“a class action may be
maintained” if certain conditions are met—“[b]y its terms . . . creates
a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified
121
criteria to pursue his claim as a class action.” Justice Scalia’s majority opinion explained with unmistakable clarity that, because the Court
viewed Rule 23 as setting forth sufficient, rather than necessary, criteria for bringing class actions, state laws imposing further duties con122
flicted with Rule 23 and would not be enforced in federal court. It
made no apparent difference that the state law may have had a different purpose or that it was able to coexist at the state level with another
123
state law structured similarly to the Federal Rule in question.
The Court also attempted to shed some light on what role state
regulatory policies (and federal sensitivity thereto) should play when a
federal court construes the Federal Rules. However, it is difficult to
discern which Justices’ views on the subject will ultimately carry the
most precedential weight. This difficulty is largely the result of potential inconsistencies between portions of the majority opinion joined by
Justice Stevens and comments made in Justice Stevens’s concurrence.
The majority opinion, in sections joined by Justice Stevens, took
strong steps to contradict the language in Gasperini regarding state interests and regulatory policies. The majority wrote that “[t]he dissent’s approach of determining whether state and federal rules conflict based on the subjective intentions of the state legislature is an
124
enterprise destined to produce ‘confusion worse confounded.’”
Specifically in response to the dissent’s invocation of Gasperini’s language regarding “important state interests” and “state regulatory policies,” the Court commented that “[t]he search for state interests and
120

Compare Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 418 (1996) (attributing dissenting votes to then-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices Stevens, Scalia,
and Thomas), with Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436, 1448 (attributing majority votes to
Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Sotomayor).
121
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437.
122
See id. at 1439 (“Rule 23 permits all class actions that meet its requirements,
and a State cannot limit that permission . . . .”). The Court went as far as to announce
its first clear-cut rule for determining when Federal Rules and state laws conflict. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion observed that “[t]he Federal Rules regularly use ‘may’ to
confer categorical permission,” implying that any state law that adds requirements to
what the Federal Rules say a litigant otherwise “may” do necessarily conflicts with the
Federal Rules. Id. at 1437.
123
Id. at 1438-39.
124
Id. at 1440-41 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
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policies that are ‘important’ is just as standardless as the ‘important or
125
substantial’ criterion we rejected in Sibbach.” The majority conceded
that federalism concerns might play a role in the interpretation of an
ambiguous Federal Rule, but only to the extent that in discerning the
Rule’s meaning, courts can assume that “‘Congress is just as concerned as we have been to avoid significant differences between state
126
and federal courts.’” In other words, courts might consider federalism concerns when attempting to discern the Rule’s meaning in general, but they will not consider the policies that the specific, potentially conflicting state law raises in the adjudication at hand.
Were it not for the concurrence, this would be a clear indication
that a majority of the Court rejected Justice Ginsburg’s belief—as expressed in Gasperini and in the Shady Grove dissent—that important
state policies should play a role at the conflict-analysis stage of Hanna.
But Justice Stevens’s concurrence appeared to rehabilitate the Gasperini language to a limited extent. He commented that, in applying the
first step of Hanna, courts should construe the Federal Rules with
127
“sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.”
However, while admitting that he agreed with Justice Ginsburg that
courts should consider state interests and regulatory policies, Justice
Stevens stated that he “disagree[d] . . . about the degree to which the
meaning of federal rules may be contorted . . . to accommodate state
128
Specifically, his citation to Justice Scalia’s dissenting
policy goals.”
opinion in Ricoh suggests that Stevens actually agreed with the majority that courts can consider federalism concerns in the abstract when
determining the general scope of a Federal Rule, but that courts should

125

Id. at 1441 n.7 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13-14). The Court also took issue
with Gasperini’s characterization of Walker as having been guided by the Court’s impression of state policies, noting that
[w]hile our opinion [in Walker] observed that the State’s actual-service rule
was (in the State’s judgment) an “integral part of the several policies served by
the statute of limitations,” nothing in our decision suggested that a federal
court may resolve an obvious conflict between the texts of state and federal
rules by resorting to the state law’s ostensible objectives.
Id. at 1440 n.6 (citation omitted) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 466 U.S. 740,
751 (1980)).
126
Id. at 1441 n.7 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38
(1988)).
127
Id. at 1451 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)).
128
Id. at 1451.
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not worry about effectuating the substantive state policies motivating
129
individual state laws when they are at the conflict-analysis stage.
Thus, Hanna and its progeny leave the following concepts for construing when a Federal Rule is sufficiently broad to control an issue:
(1) if the Federal Rules say that meeting enunciated standards is sufficient to accomplish a procedural objective, those standards suffice
even if state law calls for something greater—this is especially true if
the Rules state a litigant “may” do something; (2) the Federal Rules
should not be narrowly construed in order to avoid a “direct collision”
with state law—they should be given their plain meaning; (3) when a
Federal Rule and state statute appear to do the same thing, but govern
entirely different procedural activities, the federal court should allow
both to operate side by side; (4) when the Federal Rules leave an issue
to the court’s discretion, a mandatory state rule interfering with that
discretion will not be enforced in federal court; (5) the previous rule
is true even if the state rule is animated by different policy concerns
than the Federal Rule—to the extent that federalism concerns influence the construction of the Rules, they affect the general scope of
the Rule, but the Rule does not need to be narrowly constructed to
avoid conflict with individual state policies; and (6) effectuating a
Federal Rule may implicitly involve the use of legal standards supplied
by state law. It is under these principles that this Comment argues
certificate of merit statutes conflict with the Federal Rules.
2. Rules 8, 9, and 12
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9, and 12 provide a logical
starting point. These three rules work together to govern pleading in
130
federal court, so it makes sense to discuss them as a unit. Rule 8 re-

129

See id. at 1456-57 (“The dissent would apply the Rules of Decision Act inquiry
under Erie even to cases in which there is a governing federal rule, and thus the Act, by
its own terms, does not apply. . . . Although it reflects a laudable concern to protect
‘state regulatory policies,’ Justice Ginsburg’s approach would, in my view, work an end
run around Congress’ system of uniform federal rules, and our decision in Hanna.
Federal courts can and should interpret federal rules with sensitivity to ‘state prerogatives,’ but even when ‘state interests . . . warrant our respectful consideration,’ federal
courts cannot rewrite the rules.” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Id. at 1462, 1464 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting))).
130
Rule 8 covers pleading generally, Rule 9 covers instances in which the Federal
Rules require a heightened pleading standard, and Rule 12 covers the consequences
for insufficient pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; FED. R. CIV. P. 9; FED. R. CIV. P. 12; see also 5
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1203 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the relationship between Rule 8 and the other Rules
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quires a plaintiff’s complaint to contain “a short and plain statement
131
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Supreme Court has recently ruled that this Rule requires complaints to
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
132
If a complaint does not meet
relief that is plausible on its face.’”
these requirements, the trial court may dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6)
133
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
a. Statutes Requiring Plaintiffs to File Certificates of Merit and Complaints
Simultaneously
Certificate of merit statutes that require plaintiffs to file the certificate contemporaneously with the complaint are incompatible with
the pleading scheme established by the Federal Rules. By requiring
plaintiffs to include or attach certain items to their complaints, or else
face dismissal for failure to state a claim, these statutes have effectively
mandated a heightened pleading requirement. The analogy to Hanna and Shady Grove is striking. In Hanna, the Court found that Rule 4,
which establishes the requirements for sufficient service, operated to
134
the exclusion of state statutes requiring more demanding service.
Similarly, in Shady Grove, the Court found that Rule 23 establishes the
requirements for bringing a class action and determined that federal
135
courts should not enforce additional state law requirements. Applying this logic, lower courts should rule that, because the Federal Rules
set the sufficiency requirement for complaints in federal court, state
laws requiring more should not be enforced.

of Civil Procedure). This discussion focuses principally on the affirmative requirements of Rule 8, which implicitly operates with Rules 9 and 12.
131
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
132
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court elaborated, “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
133
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (discussing the standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)).
134
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965) (asserting that a state in-hand
service requirement directly collides with Rule 4(d)(1), which “says . . . that in-hand
service is not required in federal courts”).
135
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, at 143738 (2010) (explaining that Rule 23 permits all plaintiffs satisfying its criteria to initiate
a class action regardless of contrary state law). The Court specifically suggested that
pleading standards were difficult cases but should generally be considered procedural.
Id. at 1441.
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Rule 8’s history and motivation support this argument. The drafters of the Federal Rules created Rule 8 to depart from the highly
136
technical code pleading that preceded it. They designed Rule 8 to
provide the federal courts with a simplified form of transsubstantive
137
pleading, without formal requirements for different claims. It is antithetical to the purpose of Rule 8 to enforce state statutes under which
failing to specify certain things or include certain items in a complaint
might result in dismissal.
Several federal courts have applied similar logic. In an oft-cited
decision, Judge Alaimo in the Southern District of Georgia held that
by “requiring that the plaintiff attach to his complaint the affidavit of
an expert witness, [Georgia’s] statute in effect mandates the pleading
138
of evidentiary material.” The court concluded that “[t]he teaching
of Hanna is that, in situations of such conflict, the Federal Rule is controlling. Therefore, the sufficiency of plaintiff’s pleading must be
139
judged solely by reference to Federal Rule 8.”
Other courts have disagreed, but their reasoning seems questionable. The decision in Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Kishwaukee Valley
140
Medical Group is typical in this regard. A then-valid Illinois statute
required that a plaintiff attach to her complaint both an affidavit saying that an expert has found the claim to be reasonable and merito141
Thompson, a frerious, as well as a signed report from that expert.
quently cited opinion, held in two sentences that Rule 8 did not conflict
with the state statute, concluding that requiring the attachment of the
affidavit to the complaint does not enlarge pleading standards because
a plaintiff could attach the affidavit “and still plead the factual basis of
142
his claim in a short plain statement in the complaint itself.”
This is an illusory argument. If the sufficiency of the pleading is
judged in part by adherence to the affidavit requirement, then the affidavit requirement is part of the pleading requirement. The mere
fact that the affidavit is a physically separate document should not
136

See generally Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456 (1941) (discussing
the benefits of simplified pleadings in comparison to the technical requirements of the
earlier code-pleading regime).
137
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 130, § 1221 (discussing the transsubstantive
nature of Rule 8).
138
Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609, 611 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
139
Id.
140
No. 86-1483, 1986 WL 11381 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1986).
141
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West Supp. 2009), invalidated by Lebron
v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010).
142
Thompson, 1986 WL 11381, at *2.
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matter. Following the court’s logic would mean that any time a state
wanted to require a party to submit more than what is required by the
Federal Rules, it would merely need to label the extra part a “certificate” or “affidavit” and require it to be filed with the court on a sepa143
rate sheet of paper.
Some statutes that appear even more troublesome have gone unquestioned. Rule 9(j ) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
which are modeled after the Federal Rules, requires that a “pleading
specifically assert[] that the medical care has been reviewed by a person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness under
144
Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence and who is willing to testify.” Despite the fact that this statute openly modifies pleadings themselves
and is featured in North Carolina’s Rule 9, which governs heightened
145
pleading standards, not one published opinion from a federal court
has considered the choice of law implications of the North Carolina
146
Rule. A proper application of the principles of Hanna and its progeny mandates that Federal Rules 8 and 9 be construed as sufficiently
broad to cover the pleading standard in federal court. Therefore, certificate of merit statutes requiring plaintiffs to file certificates or affidavits contemporaneously with their complaints should not be enforced.
b. Statutes Requiring Plaintiffs to File Certificates of Merit by a Specified Point
in Time After the Filing of Complaints
The question is more difficult when dealing with statutes in the
third category—statutes that do not require an affidavit or certificate
to be filed with the pleading, but rather at some point thereafter. The
143

By arguing that Rule 8 is unchanged because a plaintiff attaching an affidavit
can otherwise adhere to Rule 8, the court has effectively argued that the pleading requirement is not heightened, because as long as one does not consider the requirements the statute adds, the statute does not add any requirements at all.
144
N.C. GEN STAT. § 1A-1 r. 9( j)(1) (2007).
145
See, e.g., Brisson v. Santoriello, 516 S.E.2d 911, 913-14 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (observing that North Carolina’s Rule 9( j) defines a “pleading requirement,” failure to
comply with which results in a dismissal under North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6)).
146
At the time of writing, a Westlaw search of the thirty-nine federal cases that cite
North Carolina’s Rule 9( j ) reveals that none contain the words “Erie ” or “Hanna.” See,
e.g., Gregory v. Schatzman, No. 08-0497, 2009 WL 3151867, at *2, *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept.
24, 2009) (failing to consider choice-of-law concerns while noting that North Carolina
Rule 9( j ) requires that a certification statement be placed “in the complaint itself
when filed” and ultimately granting defendant’s Federal Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings because of plaintiff’s failure to comply with North Carolina
Rule 9( j )). Obviously, these statutes may receive increased scrutiny in federal court in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady Grove.
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Third Circuit focused on this distinction when it ruled that New Jer147
sey’s statute was applicable in federal court. In its ruling, the court
noted that the affidavit required by New Jersey’s statute—which plaintiffs need not file until 60 days (extendable to 120 days) after the defendant files her answer—“is not a pleading, is not filed until after the
pleadings are closed, and does not contain a statement of the factual
148
basis for the claim.”
A mere difference in timing, however, is not an automatic guarantee that the statute does not offend federal pleading rules. As the
amount of time between the filing of the complaint and the date on
which the plaintiff must file her certificate or affidavit decreases—
especially if it shrinks to a point at which plaintiffs will be submitting
the certificate before defendants are likely to have filed a 12(b)(6)
149
motion for dismissal —the change in timing becomes less and less
convincing as a reason why the statute does not conflict with the Federal Rules governing pleading. However, in New Jersey’s case, the interval is sufficiently lengthy so as not to significantly disrupt the federal pleading process and requirements. The Third Circuit concluded
that, because the Federal Rules and the New Jersey statute serve different purposes (notice to defense versus the prevention of frivolous
lawsuits, respectively), and because the mechanics of the New Jersey
statute did not impede the operation of Rules 8 and 9, Walker controlled and the two enactments could operate “side by side, ‘each con-

147

See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We find no
direct conflict between the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute and Federal Rules 8
and 9.”).
148
Id. In RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., the
court compared New Jersey’s professional negligence affidavit of merit requirement to
a similar Georgia statute that federal courts in Georgia have generally found to be inapplicable in diversity suits. 981 F. Supp. 334, 343-44 (D.N.J. 1997). The court noted
first that New Jersey’s statute required filing sixty days after the defendant files her answer, whereas Georgia’s statute required contemporaneous filing. Id. The court then
noted that New Jersey’s statute only requires that the affidavit state that “there exists a
reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the
treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable
professional or occupational standards or treatment practices,” whereas the Georgia
statute requires that the affidavit “set forth specifically at least one negligent act or
omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each claim.” Id. (quoting N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 2010) and GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-9.1(a) (Supp. 2008)).
149
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (requiring the affidavit be filed within sixty days from when the defendant files an answer), and MO. REV. STAT. § 538.225 (2000)
(within ninety days of filing a complaint), with ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-114-209 (2006)
(within thirty days of filing a complaint), invalidated by Summerville v. Thrower, 253
S.W.3d 415 (Ark. 2007).
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trolling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.’” It is
doubtful, in light of Ricoh and Shady Grove, whether the Third Circuit’s
“different purposes” argument could stand alone, but the lengthy period between pleading and the affidavit filing deadline make the Third
Circuit’s holding a reasonable one.
c. The 12(b)(6) Question
Any argument suggesting that certificate of merit requirements do
not conflict with Rule 8 because they do not constitute a part of the
pleading requirement encounters problems if it foresees dismissing a
complaint filed without the certificate under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
for failure to state a claim. The Third Circuit commented that although New Jersey’s statute directs courts to dismiss lawsuits for “failure to state a claim” when the plaintiff failed to file an affidavit of merit, this consequence was not an indication that the affidavit of merit
151
The court concluded that the
statute affected pleading standards.
statutory language was merely the “legislature’s way of saying that the
consequences of a failure to file [the affidavit] shall be the same as
those of a failure to state a claim,” namely dismissal with prejudice un152
less “extraordinary circumstances” are found.
Other federal courts have routinely granted 12(b)(6) motions to
153
dismiss for failure to adhere to a certificate of merit statute. If one
150

Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160 (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S.
740, 752 (1980)).
151
See id. at 160-61 (“Contrary to the plaintiff’s suggestion, we do not read this stipulation as implying that a failure to file the required affidavit somehow renders pleadings insufficient that would otherwise be sufficient.”).
152
Id. (citing Cornblatt v. Barow, 708 A.2d 401, 415 (N.J. 1998)). An alternative
substance/procedure framework might lead to the conclusion that if a statute specifically states that failure to file the certificate of merit leaves the plaintiff susceptible to dismissal for failure to state a claim, then the statute is per se substantive. In other words,
if failure to state a claim is the legal result of noncompliance, then compliance logically
must be an element of the claim. Elements of the claim are substantive law.
There are several counters to this argument. As the Third Circuit observed, the
demurrer remedy is possibly just the state’s way of establishing the method of dismissal,
not necessarily the legal rationale behind dismissal. Id. It is also possible to argue that
successfully stating a claim logically has two components: the substantive claim itself
and the procedural act of stating it properly for the court. Viewed in this light, the affidavit requirement does not have to be considered part of the substantive legal claim.
More importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, this sort of logical parsing of the
substance/procedure distinction is not grounded in the Supreme Court’s Hanna jurisprudence and will not help answer the doctrinal question that this Section discusses.
153
See, e.g., Donnelly v. O’Malley & Langan, P.C., No. 08-1945, 2009 WL 3241662,
at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2009) (granting a motion to dismiss due to plaintiff’s failure
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accepts this Comment’s argument that certificate of merit statutes that
heighten pleading requirements are incompatible with Rules 8 and 9,
and that the only reason that statutes like the one in New Jersey do not
directly conflict with Rule 8 is because they do not affect the pleading
standard, an interesting question arises. If the affidavits are not part of
the pleading process, is it proper to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to punish
a plaintiff who has not filed one?
Rule 12(d) specifies that
[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties
must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
154
pertinent to the motion.

If the consideration of materials outside the pleadings triggers a
12(b)(6) motion to be treated as a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment, it certainly seems logical to infer that a 12(b)(6) motion
arguing that certain materials outside of the pleadings are missing
should have the same effect. Of course, if the court treats the motion
as one for summary judgment, the plaintiff should receive an opportunity to conduct discovery, thereby defeating the purpose of the cer155
tificate of merit statute. Ultimately, as with other motions to dismiss
aside from those listed in Rule 12(b), the decision of how to treat a
defendant’s motion to dismiss for plaintiff’s failure to comply with a
156
state statute lies in the discretion of the court. However, when considering such motions, courts should pay close attention to Rule 12(d)
and its tendency to require the procedural protections of Rule 56 (including a chance for discovery).

to file a certificate of merit or demonstrate a reasonable excuse for such failure), aff’d,
370 F. App’x 347 (3d Cir. 2010).
154
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
155
Presumably, plaintiffs who are unable to find an expert witness to support their
negligence theory will be unable to proceed past the summary judgment stage in states
that require the standard of care to be established by expert witnesses. See, e.g., Dodd
v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 204 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (“In malpractice
cases, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment when it is shown that the plaintiff
has no qualified expert to testify as to the applicable standard of care.”). Thus, the
purpose of the certificate of merit statutes is implicitly to require dismissal of frivolously filed suits before discovery and summary judgment.
156
See 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 130, § 1360, at 77-78 (commenting that
the trial judge’s discretion typically governs how the court handles preliminary motions to dismiss not enumerated in Rule 12(b)).
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d. The Role of Twombly and Iqbal
157

158

It might be natural to assume that Twombly and Iqbal make it
less likely that certificate of merit statutes conflict with the Federal
Rules. After all, by heightening the federal pleading standard, Twombly and Iqbal have elevated the requirements for a minimally sufficient
complaint closer to the standards espoused in certificate of merit statutes. But these cases actually make it more likely that certificate of
merit statutes conflict with the federal pleading rules.
In the wake of Twombly, some practitioners thought the Supreme
Court’s pronouncement that a pleading must provide enough factual
material to support a plausible inference of wrongdoing might apply
only to Sherman Act antitrust actions, prompting the respondent in
159
Iqbal to assert that the Twombly decision was so limited in scope. The
Court, however, concluded that the respondent’s argument was “not
supported by Twombly” and was “incompatible” with the Federal
160
Rules. The Court explicitly clarified that Rule 8 “governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States
161
This statement confirmed that while Twombly may
district courts.’”
have raised the overall pleading standard, it did not undermine the
standard’s uniformity. The Court’s prior rejections of heightened
162
standards for specific actions (Rule 9 aside) remain undisturbed. As
those who wrote on the potential conflict between the Federal Rules
of pleading and certificate of merit statutes before Twombly ob163
served, it is difficult to square the Supreme Court’s blunt statements
on the transsubstantive uniformity of Rule 8’s application with the notion that state statutes requiring more at the pleading stage might not
conflict with that Rule.
157

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
159
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Respondent first says that our decision in Twombly
should be limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute.”).
160
Id.
161
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
162
See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513, 515 (2002)
(“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions [such as those in Rule 9]. . . . [T]he Federal rules do not contain a heightened
pleading requirement for employment discrimination suits.” (emphasis added)); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168-69 (1993) (holding that federal courts cannot apply pleading standards more rigorous than those enunciated in Rule 8 for civil rights cases).
163
For an excellent discussion of the relationship between a uniform pleading
standard in federal court and state certificate of merit statutes, see Penrose & Caldwell,
supra note 58.
158
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Twombly and Iqbal have had a second impact on this discussion.
Some federal courts, typically those invoking Walker, have justified
holding that state statutes do not conflict with Rule 8 by asserting that
Rule 8’s sole purpose is to give notice to litigants, whereas the certifi164
Although the
cate of merit statutes filter out frivolous lawsuits.
Court’s rulings in Ricoh and Shady Grove cast doubt on the assumption
that different policies can excuse otherwise conflicting rules from the
165
reach of Hanna, even if one were to accept that assumption as a valid legal principle, the Court’s recent pleading jurisprudence makes
that principle inapposite to the Rule 8 question. By injecting plausibility into the Rule 8 analysis, the Court has asserted that, in addition
to providing notice of claims and defenses, Rule 8 plays a role in establishing that a plaintiff’s claims have at least a chance of being meritorious. The plausibility standard that the Court has read into Rule 8
suggests that Rule 8 gauges the sufficiency of notice and likelihood of
166
merit at the pleading stage.
3. Rule 11
Because the purpose of certificate of merit statutes is to prevent
the filing of frivolous malpractice suits, it should be unsurprising that
there are conflicts with Rule 11, which contains its own procedures for
ensuring that claims are meritorious. Rule 11 raises three concerns
about possible conflicts between certificate of merit statutes and the
Federal Rules: (1) Rule 11 explicitly states that verifications or affidavits need not be filed with the complaint; (2) certificate of merit statutes require a more rigorous verification or certification by the parties than what is required by Rule 11; and (3) the mandatory penalties
that some of these statutes contain interfere with the Court’s discretion to sanction attorneys who file frivolous claims.
164

See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The
rules’ overall purpose is to provide notice of the claims and defenses of the parties. . . . Its purpose is not to give notice of the plaintiff’s claim, but rather to assure that
malpractice claims for which there is no expert support will be terminated at an early
stage in the proceedings.”); RTC Mortg. Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 981
F. Supp. 334, 342 (D.N.J. 1997) (“The central purpose of the modern ‘short and plain
statement’ standard is to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests,’ and not much more.” (citing Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))).
165
See supra notes 104, 124-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
treatment of state policies under Erie analysis).
166
As discussed in Subsection II.A.2, supra, Hanna suggests that when the Federal
Rules set the sufficiency standard for a particular procedural device, state statutes establishing a more rigorous standard will not be enforced.
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a. Rule 11’s Qualified Rejection of Verifications or Affidavits
Rule 11 provides that “[u]nless a rule or statute specifically states
otherwise, a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an affi167
davit.”
It does not specify whether the “rule or statute” exception
applies only to federal enactments or whether state statutes can also
override the exception.
Resolution of this question could be dispositive. If the exception
contemplates inclusion of state statutes, at minimum those statutes
would not conflict with Rule 11, and one could argue that the exception specifically allows application of all certificate of merit statutes no
matter what other rules they may disrupt. On the other hand, if one
were to interpret the “rule or statute” exception as applying to federal
enactments only, then the rule is squarely in conflict with state statutes
requiring otherwise.
Scholars and practitioners have paid this topic remarkably little at168
tention.
Both Wright and Miller’s treatise and Moore’s treatise assert that the exception applies to federal rules and statutes only, but
169
neither does much to justify its conclusion. Interestingly, every case
that has considered this question in the context of certificate of merit
statutes has found that the exception does include state statutes, whereas virtually every other case that has considered the question in oth170
The
er contexts has concluded that state statutes are excluded.
167

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
Only one article, published over fifty years ago, has focused on this question.
See Royal H. Brin, Jr., Verification of Pleadings in Federal Court As Affected by Requirements of
State Statutes, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 219, 223 (1958) (concluding that “it would now seem
to be at least reasonably safe for even a cautious practitioner to omit verification of
pleadings in federal court where it would be required by state statute or rule”).
169
See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 71, at § 11.10[2], at 11-18 (“A pleading does not
have to be verified or accompanied by an affidavit, unless there is a specific provision
to that effect in a federal rule or statute.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); 5A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 130, § 1339, at 810-11 (“[T]he language presumably refers to federal statutes and rules, which means that a federal court need not follow a
forum state practice requiring verification or the attachment of an affidavit to the
pleadings.”); see also 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES
AND COMMENTARY 162 (2010) (“[Rule 11] supersedes any contrary state law verification requirement.”).
170
Compare Velazquez v. UPMC Bedford Mem’l Hosp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 549, 556
(W.D. Pa. 2004) (“Rule 11 states ‘except when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.’ . . . [The Rule]
can co-exist with a state affidavit of merit statute . . . .”), RTC Mortg. Trust 1994 N-1 v.
Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 334, 345 (D.N.J. 1997) (“Rule 11 specifically allows room for the operation of other statutes which may require an affidavit.”), and
Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Kishwaukee Valley Med. Grp., No. 86-1483, 1986 WL
168
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leading modern case addressing the topic is Farzana K. v. Indiana De171
partment of Education.
The Farzana opinion, authored by Judge Easterbrook and joined by Judges Posner and Ripple, invoked the Supreme Court’s Hanna jurisprudence to support its conclusion that
state statutes do not fit the exception. The court reasoned that
“[r]ules established under the Rules Enabling Act supersede state
172
norms.” Though the panel reached the correct conclusion, it did so
for the wrong reason.
In Gasperini, when explaining why enforcement of New York’s
standard for overturning excessive jury verdicts did not conflict with
Rule 59, the Court explained that although Rule 59 provided the procedural vehicle for requesting a new trial, that request should be eva173
luated in accordance with the New York state standard.
Thus, it is
contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding to assert that Rule 11 does
not permit the incorporation of state law in its operation because it is
part of the greater collection of Federal Rules.
A superior approach would look to the Federal Rule’s intent.
Both history and logic suggest that the exception is meant to apply only to federal enactments. The original Advisory Committee’s Note to
Rule 11 cites only federal statutes as examples of statutes requiring
174
that pleadings be verified. Moreover, the language of the Note suggests that the rulemakers’ concern was assuring that the continuity of
certain federal statutes was not disrupted. The rulemakers observed
that the “rule expressly continues any statute which requires a plead175
ing to be verified or accompanied by an affidavit.” The Rules Enabl11381, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1986) (“That § 2-622 is not a federal statute is irrelevant.
There is nothing in Rule 11 which limits the exception only to federal statutes.”), with
Farzana K. v. Indiana Dep’t of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[Rule 11(a)]
means federal rule or federal statute, because state requirements for pleading do not
apply in federal litigation.”), Follenfant v. Rogers, 359 F.2d 30, 32 n.2 (5th Cir. 1966)
(“[S]tate rules requiring verified pleadings . . . are wholly inapposite.”), and Fimbres v.
Chapel Mortgage Corp., No. 09-0886, 2009 WL 4163332, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20,
2009) (“[A] federal court need not follow a forum state practice requiring verification.”(citing Farzana K., 473 F.3d at 705)).
171
Farzana K., 473 F.3d at 705. This case is cited in numerous cases and secondary
sources. See, e.g., Fimbres, 2009 WL 4163332, at *6; H.H. ex rel. Hough v. Ind. Bd. of
Special Educ. Appeals, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1193 (N.D. Ind. 2007); GENSLER, supra
note 169, at 162; 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 71, § 11.10, at 11-18 n.7.
172
Farzana K., 473 F.3d at 705.
173
See supra text accompanying notes 111-13 (discussing Gasperini’s incorporation
of state legal standards into the operation of a Federal Rule).
174
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1937) (listing as examples 28
U.S.C. §§ 381, 762, and 829).
175
Id.
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ing Act, of course, did not give the rulemakers the ability to discontinue in toto the operation of any state statutes. It did, however, give
them the ability to supersede already existing federal laws under
176
The exception thus makes sense as a declara28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
tion that the rulemakers were not exercising their explicitly granted
ability to supersede already existing federal laws.
The remarks of one of the Federal Rules’ primary architects supports this understanding of the rulemakers’ intent. In a 1941 article,
Judge Charles E. Clark declared that “[R]ule 11 does away with the all
177
too barren formality of an oath to pleadings.” The sweeping nature
of Judge Clark’s language suggests that any exceptions to the changes
made by Rule 11 would be few. There is also a lengthy body of case
law denying the enforcement of state law verification requirements
178
without consideration of the “rule or statute” exception. In light of
judicial precedent, the apparent intent of Rule 11, and the overall
federal orientation of the Rule’s structure, the logical conclusion is
that the exception applies only to federal enactments.
b. The Heightened Verification and Certification Requirement Implemented by
Certificate of Merit Statutes
Rule 11 requires that at least one attorney of record sign every
179
pleading. By signing a complaint, the filing attorney declares, to the
best of her knowledge after a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances, that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law” and
“the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so

176

See 18 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (“All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”).
177
Clark, supra note 136, at 463 (emphasis added).
178
See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 130, § 1339, at 810 n.4, 811 n.5 (collecting
cases in which federal courts rejected adherence to state verification laws). Of course,
it is possible to speculate whether Shady Grove provides any clues as to how the current
Supreme Court might rule if confronted with this question. To the extent that Shady
Grove represents a preference for federal domination of procedure, the opinion suggests that the exception is limited to federal enactments. However, Shady Grove also
represents a preference for a mechanical reading of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Justices espousing such a viewpoint might well reject adding an exclusively federal limitation to the text of the exception.
179
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
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identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable oppor180
tunity for further investigation or discovery.”
Problematically, certificate of merit statutes requiring the attorney
to file a certificate stating that she has consulted with an expert seem
to heighten this requirement. Rule 11 indicates that by signing a
pleading, the attorney is averring both to the nonfrivolity of claims
presented therein and to the fact that she has made a reasonable in181
The Rule explicitly states that
quiry into the complaint’s contents.
182
no other verifications or affidavits are required.
This Rule is too broad to leave room for the operation of a statute
like Florida’s, which requires that the attorney, after making a reasonable investigation, include with her complaint “a certificate of counsel
that such reasonable investigation gave rise to a good faith belief that
183
grounds exist for an action against each named defendant.”
Both
Hanna and Shady Grove suggest that when the Federal Rules establish a
sufficiency standard, that standard operates to the exclusion of more
184
burdensome state laws.
A number of federal courts considering the question have come to
the opposite answer, but their reasoning is questionable. For example,
in Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., the Tenth Circuit deter185
mined that an analogous Colorado law did not conflict with Rule 11.
The court conceded that both rules “operate[] in a similar fashion” and
that both “demonstrate an intent to weed unjustifiable claims out of the

180

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)–(3).
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a)–(b).
182
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“[A] pleading need not be verified or accompanied by
an affidavit.”).
183
FLA. STAT. § 766.104(1) (2010). Good faith, in turn, exists when the attorney
has received written opinions from experts. Id.
184
See supra notes 78-79, 121-23, and accompanying text.
185
See 90 F.3d 1523, 1540 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Despite the superficial similarity of
the two rules, we conclude that they do not collide.”). This was a professional negligence case governed under the same Colorado certificate of merit statute that applies
to medical malpractice actions. Id. at 1539. The Colorado statute requires that the
certificate of merit confirm
181

(I) [t]hat the attorney has consulted a person who has expertise in the area of
the alleged negligent conduct; and (II) [t]hat the professional who has been
consulted pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a) has reviewed the
known facts, including such records, documents, and other materials which
the professional has found to be relevant to the allegations of negligent conduct and, based on the review of such facts, has concluded that the filing of
the claim, counterclaim, or cross claim does not lack substantial justification.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602(3)(a) (2008).

GROSSBERG_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform

11/18/2010 9:55 AM

255

186

system.”
Nevertheless, despite the “superficial similarity,” the Tenth
187
Circuit concluded the rules did not collide for two reasons.
First, the court noted that Rule 11 targets attorneys (and pro se
188
parties) whereas the Colorado statute penalizes the parties directly.
However, this is a fair representation of neither Rule 11 nor Colorado’s statute. Both rules require the attorney to sign or execute the
189
As for deterrence, Colorado’s statute requires
requisite document.
190
dismissal of the claim if the attorney fails to file the certificate.
Rule 11 calls for unsigned papers to be struck and allows sanctions for
191
papers signed in bad faith.
It is difficult to understand the Tenth
Circuit’s analysis here. Noncompliance under either rule results in the
case not moving forward (it is difficult to proceed when one’s complaint has been struck), punishing both the party and the attorney (especially considering that most of the affected plaintiffs’ attorneys will
be operating on a contingency basis). Furthermore, Rule 11’s text and
the Advisory Committee Notes make it abundantly clear that sanctions
192
can be applied to either the attorneys or the parties themselves.
The Tenth Circuit’s second argument is also puzzling. The court
asserted that the statute and Federal Rule do not conflict because the
193
state statute has an additional purpose. The court explained that in
addition to weeding out frivolous claims, the Colorado statute also
seeks “‘to expedite the litigation process’” by imposing a time limit on
194
Again, this reasoning is questionable because the
the certificate.
Federal Rules require confirmation that a filing is nonfrivoulous at the
time of filing, not sixty days later as required by the Colorado statute.
Moreover, Ricoh held that the fact that policies are not perfectly coextensive does not guarantee enforcement of an otherwise conflicting
195
Shady Grove added that federalism concerns regarding
state rule.
186

Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1540.
Id.
188
Id.
189
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (“Every pleading . . . must be signed by at least
one attorney . . . .”), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602(3)(a) (2008) (“A certificate of
review shall be executed by the attorney . . . .”).
190
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602(4).
191
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a)–(c).
192
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The
sanction should be imposed on the persons—whether attorneys, law firms, or parties—
who have violated the rule . . . .”).
193
See Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1540.
194
Id. (quoting Martinez v. Badis, 842 P.2d 245, 251 (Colo. 1992)).
195
See supra text accompanying note 105 (discussing the Ricoh Court’s disregard
for differing policy rationales).
187
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state policies will be considered only in generalized evaluations of the
196
Rule’s validity under the Rules Enabling Act. Both decisions suggest
197
that the Tenth Circuit’s arguments are unavailing.
Other courts have made arguments similar to those of the Tenth
Circuit. For instance, in Hill v. Morrison, the district court concluded
that Rule 11 does not conflict with Missouri’s affidavit requirement
because Missouri has a state rule of civil procedure modeled on
Rule 11 that operates in state court concomitantly with the affidavit of
198
merit statute. This argument is astonishingly similar to the one the
199
Supreme Court considered and rejected in Burlington Northern.
c. Discretion to Punish Under Rule 11
The most troublesome concern regarding Rule 11 arises over the
question of punishment for noncompliance or compliance in bad
faith. Rule 11(c) commits to the discretion of the trial judge the decision of whether to impose sanctions for a violation of Rule 11(b)’s
good faith certification requirement, whereas many certificate of merit statutes make punishment mandatory for failing to file a certificate
200
or filing in bad faith. The Court’s ruling in Burlington Northern is directly on point here. Just as the Court ruled that Alabama’s mandatory penalty for losing parties at the appellate level would interfere with

196

See supra text accompanying note 126 (discussing the Shady Grove Court’s understanding of the relevance of state regulatory policies when interpreting ambiguous
Federal Rules).
197
Obviously, this Comment does not fault the Tenth Circuit or any other court
for failing to foresee the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady Grove.
198
See 870 F. Supp. 978, 982 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (“Just as section 538.225 and Missouri Rule 55.03 can both apply in state court without conflict, so too both section
538.225 and Rule 11 can be given effect in federal court in a diversity action.”).
199
See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987) (concluding that it
was irrelevant that Alabama’s law punishing frivolous appeals operated side by side
with a state law based on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38).
200
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The
court has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a violation . . . .”), with FLA. STAT. § 766.104 (2010) (declaring that if an attorney did not file in good faith, “the court shall award attorney’s fees and taxable costs
against claimant’s counsel, and shall submit the matter to The Florida Bar for disciplinary review of the attorney” (emphasis added)) and TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26122(d)(3) (Supp. 2009) (“[T]he court shall award appropriate sanctions against the
attorney . . . . [T]he court shall forward the order to the board of professional responsibility for appropriate action. . . . [T]he court shall, upon motion, require the party or
party’s counsel to post a bond in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per
adverse party in any future medical malpractice case to secure payment of sanctions for
any violation of this section in such case.” (emphasis added)).
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a judge’s discretion to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals, a state
statute mandating that a judge impose sanctions for failure to file a
certificate of merit in good faith interferes with the judge’s discretion
as to whether and how to punish a party who has knowingly filed a fri201
volous complaint.
Although the Supreme Court has twice found a mandatory state
202
statute to conflict with a discretionary Federal Rule, the mandatory/discretionary distinction was cited at least once as a reason why a
Federal Rule and state statute did not conflict. In RTC Mortgage Trust
1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., to support its holding
that the New Jersey statute did not conflict with Rule 11, the court observed that “the Affidavit of Merit statute mandates that failure to consult with and provide an affidavit from an expert ‘shall be deemed a
failure to state a cause of action.’ Rule 11, on the other hand, makes
203
sanctions discretionary.”
Contrary to the court’s understanding in RTC Mortgage Trust, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that state rules that extinguish the
discretion federal judges possess, especially in the context of penalizing
parties for frivolous actions, conflict with Federal Rules providing that
discretion and therefore should not be enforced in federal court.
4. Rules 26 and 37
Certificate of merit statutes that require the plaintiff to disclose
substantive information concerning the opinions of the consulted expert conflict with the disclosure and discovery provisions of the Federal Rules in three ways: (1) they destroy the discretion that a trial
judge has over the timing of expert-report disclosures; (2) they may
disrupt protections in the Federal Rules against discovery of advice
from nontestifying experts; and (3) they destroy the trial judge’s discretion to punish noncompliant parties.

201

See Burlington, 480 U.S. at 7 (“Thus, the Rule’s discretionary mode of operation
unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision of Alabama’s affirmance penalty
statute.”).
202
See id.; Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30-32 (1988) (finding that
the mandatory Alabama law against enforcement of forum selection clauses destroyed
the discretion the federal venue-transfer statute provided).
203
981 F. Supp 334, 345 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-19 (West
Supp. 2010)).
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a. Disclosure Timing
Rule 26(a)(2)(C) gives the trial court discretion to determine
when parties must disclose the identities and reports of any expert
204
witnesses. The statutes of a number of states completely destroy this
discretion.
At the extreme, Texas’s statute comes close to implementing its
own disclosure and discovery scheme, requiring that within 120 days
of filing a complaint, the plaintiff serve each defendant with a full ex205
pert report and curriculum vitae. The mandatory 120-day time limit
is in direct conflict with Rule 26(a)(2)(C)’s discretionary timing.
Most federal courts that have considered whether Texas’s law applies
206
in diversity suits have concluded that it does not.
As with Rules 8, 9, 11, and 12, courts in other states have found no
conflict, but their reasoning is again suspect. Minnesota’s statute requires that within 180 days of filing a complaint, the plaintiff must produce signed affidavits containing detailed reports from experts who are
207
expected to testify.
In Ellingson v. Walgreen Co., the plaintiff argued
208
that Minnesota’s statute conflicted with Rule 26(a).
In rejecting the
209
plaintiff’s argument, the trial court did not analyze the Erie issue.
Without citing Hanna or its progeny, the trial court merely listed four
federal courts that had also applied the statute (only one of which had
204

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(C) (“A party must make these disclosures at the
times and in the sequence that the court orders.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory
committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“Normally the court should prescribe a time
for these disclosures . . . .”).
205
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West Supp. 2009).
206
For a thorough discussion of why federal courts should not enforce Texas’s
law, see Poindexter v. Bonsukan, 145 F. Supp. 2d 800, 803-10 (E.D. Tex. 2001). Accord
Hall v. Trisun, No. 05-0984, 2006 WL 1788192, at *2-4 (W.D. Tex. June 23, 2006); Garza v. Scott & White Mem’l Hosp., 234 F.R.D. 617, 621-23 (W.D. Tex. 2005); Brown v.
Brooks Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 04-0329, 2005 WL 1515466, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. June 23,
2005); Nelson v. Myrick, No. 04-0828, 2005 WL 723459, at *2-4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29,
2005); McDaniel v. United States, No. 04-0314, 2004 WL 2616305, at *5-9 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 16, 2004). But see Cruz v. Chang, 400 F. Supp. 2d 906, 911-15 (W.D. Tex. 2005)
(holding that Texas’s statute should apply in federal court). A district court in South
Dakota, applying North Dakota law, reached an identical conclusion to Poindexter and
barred application of a similar North Dakota statute. See Serocki v. MeritCare Health
Sys., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1211 (D.S.D. 2004) (concluding that North Dakota’s affidavit requirement does not apply in federal court).
207
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 2005) (requiring identification of expert
witnesses, as well as “the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion”).
208
See 78 F. Supp. 2d 965, 968 (D. Minn. 1999) (“Plaintiffs particularly claim the
1993 amendments to [Federal Rule] 26(a) preempt . . . § 145.682 in diversity cases.”).
209
See id. (rejecting plaintiff’s argument summarily).
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actually considered the Erie question) and concluded that the plaintiff’s
210
argument “has been uniformly rejected by the federal courts.”
The one court cited in Ellingson that had considered the Erie issue
also issued a suspect opinion. In Oslund v. United States, an FTCA case
in which the plaintiff asserted that Minnesota’s expert statue conflicted with the Federal Rules, the court cited an Eighth Circuit case as
an example of an “action dismissed for failure to file an expert affida211
However, in the cited case, the Eighth
vit required by § 145.682.”
Circuit reversed a dismissal and held that the affidavit of merit statute
did not apply because the plaintiffs filed their case before the statute
212
became effective. The Oslund court, after misconstruing the Eighth
Circuit’s decision, merely concluded that because dismissal under the
statute is mandatory, the plaintiff was incorrect to characterize it as
213
Therefore, “[a]fter careful consideration of
“purely procedural.”
the statute and cases construing it,” the court held that Minnesota’s
statute “is not the sort of purely procedural rule which should be
214
preempted by the Federal Rules in federal question cases.”
b. Nontestifying Experts Under Rule 26
A second potential conflict involves Rule 26(b)(4)(B), which
states that, under ordinary circumstances, “a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an
expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party
in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not ex-

210

Id. For an extended discussion of the decision in Ellingson, see Poindexter, 145
F. Supp. 2d at 805-06.
211
701 F. Supp. 710, 713 (D. Minn. 1988) (construing Hughes v. Mayo Clinic, 834
F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1987)).
212
See Hughes, 834 F.2d at 715 (“Since [the Minnesota statute] does not apply to
suits commenced prior to August 1, 1986, the requirement of expert review does not
apply to the Hughes’ suit.”).
213
Oslund, 701 F. Supp. at 713-14.
214
Id. at 714. In case readers are concerned that the difference between F TCA
and diversity cases makes this decision irrelevant, the court explained that its ruling
was ensuring conformity between F TCA and diversity actions. See id. (“If the contrary
was true, the anomalous result would be that the federal government would be exposed to liability when a cause of action involving similar conduct would be dismissed
in a diversity case . . . .”). It is also interesting that this decision, which did not mention
a single Supreme Court opinion in the entire Erie line of cases, seemed to suggest that
the Federal Rules only trumped if the state rule was “purely procedural.” Id. at 714. As
the Supreme Court noted in Hanna, matters “falling within the uncertain area between
substance and procedure[] are rationally capable of classification as either.” Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
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pected to be called as a witness at trial.” The Advisory Committee’s
Note goes as far as to suggest that a “proper showing” is required even
216
to obtain the names of nontestifying experts.
Rule 26 thus gives parties a qualified right to protect from discovery
the opinions, and sometimes even the identities, of experts whom they
will not call to testify. Statutes requiring the disclosure of expert opinions and identities, without regard to whether the party intends to call
the expert as a witness, necessarily interfere with this right. Unless the
plaintiff knows that the affiant-expert will testify, an affidavit of merit
statute forces the plaintiff to disclose advice from the affiant that the
Rules make undiscoverable. It appears that no court to date has considered whether state certificate of merit statutes conflict with
217
Rule 26(b)(4)(B), but there is a strong argument that they do.
c. Punishment for Noncompliance Under Rule 37
The last potential conflict with the Federal Rules governing discovery involves punishment for noncompliance. Under Rule 37(c), if
a party fails to disclose an expert report or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a), the default penalty is exclusion of that witness
218
from the trial. However, Rule 37 entrusts the trial judge with great
discretion to modify the penalty in a number of ways, ranging from
postponing the proceedings until the delinquent party discloses the
information to dismissing the action and awarding attorneys’ fees to
219
When a state statute contains mandatory penalties
the other side.
for failing to produce an expert report by a specific date, it extinguishes the judge’s discretion to impose the penalty she sees fit.
For example, Texas’s statute requires that a court dismiss a complaint with prejudice and award attorneys’ fees and court costs to the

215

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B). Excepted from this Rule are experts conducting a
physical or mental examination ordered pursuant to Rule 35(b) and instances where
“exceptional circumstances” make it “impracticable for the party to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means.” Id. 26(b)(4)(B)(i)–(ii).
216
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment (“[A] party
may on a proper showing require the other party to name experts retained or specifically employed . . . .”); see also 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, § 2032, at 101-105 (2010) (discussing the meaning of “proper showing”).
217
One question that may arise is whether Rule 26(b)(4)(B) impermissibly creates
a privilege. That question, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
218
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).
219
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi) (listing the orders that a court
may issue in response to a party’s failure to comply with Rule 37(a)).
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defendant if the plaintiff has not served each defendant with an ex220
pert report within 120 days of filing her complaint. Under the principles of Burlington Northern and Ricoh, Rule 37 is sufficiently broad to
control the question of how to punish those who do not submit expert
221
reports, leaving no room for operation of the state statutes. Enforcing the Texas statute would extinguish the discretion granted under
the Federal Rules. As the court in Poindexter v. Bonsukan observed,
even though the mandatory penalties under Texas law are within the
range of what a judge could order under Rule 37, the rules conflict
because they “cannot operate simultaneously without one being sub222
ordinated to the other.”
B. The Two Prongs of Hanna: A Paradox
A thorough examination of state certificate of merit statutes, the
Federal Rules, and Hanna and its progeny show that, being faithful to
the Supreme Court’s holdings as a whole, almost all certificate of merit statutes conflict with at least one Federal Rule and should not be
enforced in federal court.
But what about the borderline cases? What about the certificates
that are due long after pleading has concluded, do not require the
submission of substantive expert opinions, and do not interfere with a
judge’s discretion in punishing frivolous or otherwise misbehaving
litigants?
Hanna stated that if there is no direct conflict between a Federal
Rule and state law, courts should apply the modified outcomedetermination test to see if the state law must be given effect over the
223
traditional federal practice. However, this instruction comes with a
warning. If one analyzes the outcome-determination test by comparing what happens to a litigant who adheres to a procedural requirement with one who does not, then “every procedural variation is ‘out224
Instead, courts should apply the outcomecome-determinative.’”
determination test with an eye to the “the twin aims of the Erie rule:

220

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West Supp. 2009).
See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text (discusing how Burlington Northern and Ricoh found the discretion granted to trial courts by Rule 38 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), respectively, conflicted with nondiscretionary state law provisions).
222
145 F. Supp. 2d 800, 809 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
223
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-71 (1965).
224
Id. at 468-69.
221
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discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable ad225
ministration of the laws.”
In light of Hanna, this Section will apply the outcomedetermination test to New Jersey’s statute because, as the country’s
most innocuous certificate of merit statute, it is the statute least likely
to interfere with any of the Federal Rules. New Jersey’s statute requires that within 60 days (extendable to 120 days) of receiving the defendant’s answer, the plaintiff file an affidavit from a sufficiently qualified expert stating that there is at least a “reasonable probability” that
226
the defendant’s care fell outside the professional norm.
The Third Circuit in Chamberlain began its modified outcomedetermination analysis of New Jersey’s statute by commenting that the
227
statute is “outcome determinative on its face.” The court explained
that because litigants who did not comply with the statute would face
dismissal, “failure to apply the statute in a federal diversity action
where no affidavit of merit has been filed would produce a different
228
outcome than that mandated in a state proceeding.” This is precisely
the syllogistic conception of outcome determination that Hanna
warned reduces the test to a truism.
The Third Circuit then analyzed the statute under the twin aims
of Erie. The court concluded that failure to enforce the statute would
lead to forum shopping because a plaintiff in federal court who is
“unable to secure expert support” might nevertheless “be able to sur229
vive beyond the pleading stage and secure discovery.”
This argument has a number of problems. First, it raises internal consistency
questions because the same court that earlier refused to characterize
New Jersey’s certificate of merit statute as a pleading requirement later associated adherence to the statute with survival beyond the plead230
Still more relevant to the question at hand, the Third
ing stage.
Circuit’s argument is based on the erroneous assumption that discovery does not occur until after the plaintiff serves his affidavit.

225

Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 2010).
227
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000).
228
Id. at 161.
229
Id. The opinion goes on to raise the specter of the “fishing expedition.” Id.
230
Compare id. at 160 (distinguishing Rules 8 and 9 from the state statute on the
ground that only the former govern pleadings), with id. at 161 (discussing the potential
for plaintiffs with little expert support to “survive beyond the pleading stage” in federal
court).
226
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On the contrary, in terms of document production, if the physician-defendants fail to provide any of the plaintiff’s relevant medical
231
records, the affidavit requirement is waived. As for disclosure, interrogatories, and depositions, formal discovery proceeds over the 60
days (extendable to 120 days on a showing of good cause) between
when the defendant serves his answer and when the plaintiff must
232
In a medical malpractice action, with a limited
serve his affidavit.
number of potential deponents, it is unlikely that plaintiffs’ counsel
might hope to achieve a markedly more intrusive “fishing expedition”
in federal court than she could achieve in state court given 120 days of
discovery and full access to the relevant documents.
As for the inequitable administration of justice, the Third Circuit
concluded that defendants in federal court would be “unfairly exposed to additional litigation time and expense before the dismissal of
233
a non-meritorious lawsuit.”
Again, this assertion is questionable.
Presumably, either 60 or 120 days after the defendant files his answer,
a plaintiff unable to secure expert support would be tossed out of state
court for failure to adhere to the affidavit of merit statute. The result
would not be markedly different in federal court. New Jersey substantive law requires expert testimony to establish the standard of care in a
234
malpractice action. If a plaintiff does not produce an expert affidavit stating that the standard of care was violated, a federal court will
235
At most, it
grant a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
seems that the defendant in federal court would be exposed to a long236
er period of discovery before she could win the case with prejudice.
231

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-28 (providing for a “sworn statement in lieu of the
affidavit” when defendants are noncompliant).
232
See Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 836 A.2d 779, 780, 785 (N.J. 2003)
(noting that “[d]iscovery proceeded in the ordinary course” during the 120 days plaintiff had to file her affidavit of merit and instructing trial courts that part of discovery
management is ensuring that plaintiff’s counsel is aware of affidavit requirements and
deadlines).
233
Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 161.
234
See Rosenberg ex rel. Rosenberg v. Cahill, 492 A.2d 371, 374 (N.J. 1985) (“It is
generally recognized that in the ordinary medical malpractice case ‘the standard of
practice to which [the defendant-practitioner] failed to adhere must be established by
expert testimony . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 167
A.2d 625 (N.J. 1966)).
235
See, e.g., Wenner v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 04-3414, 2009 WL 1089555, at
*6-7 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2009) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss a medical malpractice claim because plaintiff did not produce an expert affidavit stating that defendant had violated the standard of care).
236
Cf. Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White Berch, An Essay Regarding Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc. and the Demise of the Uniform Application of the Federal Rules of
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The internal strain in the logic of Chamberlain is representative of
a paradox built into Hanna that favors the application of federal law
in this and analogous situations. To hold that state law must be enforced, a federal court must minimize the scope of the state statute
when deciding if the statute conflicts with the Federal Rules (“this
isn’t a pleading requirement”) and then aggrandize the role of the
statute when deciding if it is outcome determinative (“this statute determines survival past the pleading stage”).
In other words, the paradox is that the statutes that are most innocuous in terms of procedural hurdles are least likely to conflict with
a Federal Rule, but they are also much less likely to be outcome determinative in a way that implicates the twin aims of Erie. Conversely,
the statutes that are more likely to be considered outcome determinative should never reach the second stage of the analysis because they
are so disruptive of the Federal Rules. For example, few would argue
that Georgia’s statute, which requires that the complaint be filed with
a detailed expert report, would not encourage forum shopping. But
the federal courts in Georgia never reach that stage of the analysis because they always find that the statute conflicts with the Federal
237
Rules.
III. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CERTIFICATE OF MERIT STATUTES
A faithful application of Hanna and its progeny suggests that certificate of merit statutes are not applicable in federal court. The vast
majority of the statutes conflict directly with at least one of the Federal
Rules, and, in cases where the statute is so innocuous that it does not
wander across the path of one of the Federal Rules, the very mildness
that ensures it survives the first prong of Hanna spells its doom on the
second prong.
At the same time, certificate of merit statutes represent clear attempts by the states to regulate substantive policy issues (namely, medical malpractice), albeit through procedural reforms. None of the
tests enunciated by Hanna and its progeny for determining when a
Federal Rule and a state law conflict requires treating a state proceCivil Procedure, 69 MISS. L.J. 715, 727 (1999) (criticizing the Trierweiler court for deciding that Colorado’s statute was outcome determinative because “rejecting the state rule
would merely postpone the stage at which some noncertifiable cases would be dismissed”).
237
See, e.g., Baird v. Celis, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360-61 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (finding a
conflict between the Georgia expert-affidavit requirement and Rule 8(a)); Boone v.
Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609, 611 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (same).
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dural rule particular to one area of substantive law any differently
than a transsubstantive state procedural rule. This Part of the Comment, in light of the “Hanna paradox” and the Court’s decision in
Shady Grove, first considers whether Erie jurisprudence needs a major
overhaul to allow easier enforcement of substantively motivated state
litigation reforms in federal court. Rejecting a major overhaul as imprudent, this Part then considers whether a more moderate reform of
the Erie doctrine might be justified to protect federalism. Concluding
that a moderate revision of Erie is defensible, this Part then reconsiders certificate of merit statutes in light of such a revision. This Comment’s conclusion is that, although certificate of merit statutes are not
within the scope of state legislation that would be protected by a minor revision to the Erie doctrine, this result is acceptable because subordination of the statutes in federal court results in only minimal
threats to federalism.
Prior to Gasperini and Shady Grove, the Seventh Circuit determined
that federal courts must consider whether state procedural reforms
are limited to a substantive policy area. In S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee
Metropolitan Sewerage District, Judge Posner indicated that there are two
categories of state procedural rules, the applicability of which presents
238
The first category consists of
a simple question for federal courts.
239
state rules that squarely conflict with the Federal Rules. The second
group “of pretty easy cases is where the state procedural rule, though
undeniably ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of the term, is limited
240
At the time, Judge Posner’s asserto a particular substantive area.”
241
tion was supported by citations to other Seventh Circuit cases only.
The analysis described for such cases was not grounded in the Su242
Although Justice Ginsburg repreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence.

238

See 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995) (“There are, however, two classes of pretty
clear cases . . . .”).
239
See id. (describing the first category of cases as those “in which the state rule is
in actual conflict with one of the Federal Rules”).
240
Id.
241
See id. (citing several sources in reference to tort-specific rules, including Todd
ex rel. Todd v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 942 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n. 1 (7th Cir.
1991), Jones v. Griffith, 870 F.2d 1363, 1368 (7th Cir. 1989), and Hines v. Elkhart General
Hospital, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979)).
242
See id. (suggesting that the analysis for this group of cases turns on whether
state goals are substantively designed); see also supra note 112 (criticizing Gasperini’s
reliance upon Healy’s analysis).
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243

troactively tried to incorporate Healy into the doctrine, the Court in
244
Shady Grove, perhaps owing to changes in membership, rejected incorporating Healy’s concern for individual state policies into the Han245
This struggle is indicative of the perception of
na conflict analysis.
some that Hanna is inadequate when it comes to protecting state prerogatives, especially when substantive state policies shape procedural
litigation reforms.
Several scholars have explicitly criticized Hanna’s tendency to
trump substantively motivated state legislation. Professor Lynch has
argued that because Hanna prevents the enforcement of state litigation reform measures in federal court, the decision should be
scrapped and replaced with a system of comparative impairment, under which federal courts would determine the prevailing procedural
law by asking whether the federal or state government would be more
246
impaired if its law were subordinated. Lynch asserts that Hanna and
the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act occurred before the Supreme Court or Congress could have foreseen the “litigation reform
247
movement.” The implicit suggestion is that, had the Supreme Court
and Congress known that states would attempt to control substantive
areas of policy by regulating procedure, Hanna and the Rules Enabling Act would have been structured in a way that would allow the effectuation of state litigation reform in federal court. However, despite
the appeal of these arguments, they must fail.
Professor Lynch’s argument that Hanna and the Rules Enabling
Act predate the litigation reform movement is factually inaccurate.
Tort reform movements, which tend to occur cyclically, date back to

243

See supra text accompanying notes 111-13 (noting Justice Ginsburg’s efforts to
install avoidance of conflict with state regulatory interests as a guiding principle in
construing a Federal Rule’s scope).
244
See supra note 120 (comparing the composition of the majority for Gasperini in
1996 with its composition for Shady Grove in 2010).
245
See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (explaining the Shady Grove majority’s rejection of a standard based on the subjective intent of state legislators).
246
See John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal Procedure and Erie: Saving State Litigation Reform
Through Comparative Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 285-86 (2008) (urging either
the Supreme Court or Congress to ensure “appropriate deference to state litigation
reform measures in diversity cases” and suggesting comparative impairment as a means
by which to do so); see also Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie after Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1643 (1998) (hoping that Gasperini signals a “heightened
sensitivity” to any impact a Hanna ruling might have on state policy concerns).
247
See Lynch, supra note 246, at 293-94 (asserting that the litigation reform movement “could not even have been imagined by the Hanna Court in 1965” or by Congress in 1934).
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248

the nineteenth century.
To the extent that his argument is accurate—that states enacted the specific statutes about which he has
voiced concern (including certificate of merit statutes) after Hanna
and the Rules Enabling Act—this Comment draws a different conclusion. Because the states passed their statutes after the Court’s ruling
in Hanna (and in most instances, after Burlington Northern and Ricoh),
the states enacted their litigation reform with full notice that any reforms conflicting with the Federal Rules would not be enforced in
federal court. Instead of considering Hanna’s antecedence to state
litigation-reform statutes as a reason to question Hanna’s validity, we
should view Hanna as an indication that state legislatures knew or
should have known that attempts to regulate tort claims via procedural reforms in conflict with the Federal Rules (or, alternatively, procedural reforms that are not outcome determinative with respect to the
twin aims of Erie) would not affect claims in federal court.
There is, however, a more compelling argument against a major
overhaul of Hanna in order to accommodate state procedural litigation reform motivated by substantive concerns. Although applying
certificate of merit statutes in federal court may seem harmless in isolation, allowing any state procedural reform that regulates a substantive area of law to trump the Federal Rules would, in the aggregate,
have a disastrous effect on the uniformity of practice in the federal
courts. Under such a system, the more states choose to regulate substantive policy through procedural reform, the more the resultant disruption to the uniformity of federal procedure would approach the
level of disruption one would expect if the federal courts wholly applied transsubstantive state procedural rules. As more state procedural rules replace Federal Rules, procedure in the federal courts would
begin to resemble federal procedure during the unsatisfactory days of
249
the Conformity Act.

248

See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform
in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 955-69 (2004) (discussing critiques of the medical malpractice litigation system and proposals for reform in the nineteenth century); John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American
Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1168-69 (2005) (discussing late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth century enactments of state constitutional provisions designed to restrict
wrongful death litigation).
249
See RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 20 (9th ed. 2007) (characterizing the mixture of federal and state procedure under the Conformity Act as “rampantly confusing”); Burbank, supra note 68, at 1039-42 (cataloging contemporary discontent with the Conformity Act).
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Uniformity of procedure was among the foremost goals motivating Congress and the rulemakers to draft the Federal Rules of Civil
250
Procedure. The Supreme Court explicitly identified preservation of
251
that uniformity as the impetus for its decision in Hanna. Without the
uniformity imposed by Hanna, the federal courts of each state would
assume their own idiosyncratic combination of state and federal procedural laws. This would have a pernicious effect on both interstate
252
and transsubstantive procedural uniformity. In other words, not only
would attorneys who practice in federal court in different states be
tasked with learning multiple sets of procedural rules, but attorneys
who practice in multiple substantive areas within the federal courts of
253
one state would also have to juggle different sets of procedural rules.
250

See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 496 (9th ed. 2005) (framing
the Federal Rules as a response to “an extended period of agitation for uniform procedural rules”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
429, 432 (6th ed. 2002) (listing “erratic conformity to state procedure” as one of the
three problems the Federal Rules were intended to address and stating that the uniform procedure provided by the Rules in itself “would be a fine accomplishment”);
Burbank, supra note 68, at 1043-1095 (chronicling the history of the Rules Enabling
Act, including the activities of the ABA’s Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure
and early drafts of the Act in the form of the Uniform Federal Procedure Bill).
251
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965) (“Because of the threat to the
goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below, we granted certiorari.” (citation omitted)).
252
Cf. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2006 (1989) (identifying four “strands” of procedural uniformity: “interdistrict court uniformity, intrastate
uniformity, trans-substantive uniformity, and . . . uniformity of result”). One could argue that uniformity in the Federal Rules is a myth (or at least an exaggeration), because the Rules largely provide discretionary authority to federal judges. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1987) (book
review) (“Many of the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense.”); Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Case For Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 88-89 (1997) (arguing that the lack of “limits and
constraints” in the Federal Rules has led to “disuniformity and experimentation”).
The validity of these criticisms notwithstanding, even when the Rules provide judicial
discretion, they play a normative role in defining when discretion exists and how
broadly the range of discretion extends. Thus, to the extent that the Rules provide a
set of answers to a series of equations balancing uniformity and discretion, those equations are applied uniformly. Litigants therefore know the presumptive areas and
ranges within which a federal judge may exercise discretion and the appellate process
acts as a check on judges who stray beyond the tolerated ranges of discretion.
253
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1441
(2010) (criticizing the dissent’s policy-driven approach because “[i]t would mean, to
begin with, that one State’s statute could survive pre-emption (and accordingly affect
the procedures in federal court) while another State’s identical law would not, merely
because its authors had different aspirations”).
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Nevertheless, while a major overhaul of Hanna might pose an unjustifiably large threat to procedural uniformity, the jurisprudence as
framed by the majority in Shady Grove is not necessarily adequate.
Threats to federalism might not warrant injecting individual state policies into the conflict-analysis prong of Hanna, but it does not necessarily follow that a more moderate revision of the doctrine is similarly
254
And if states attempt to
imprudent. After all, procedure is power.
use that power to accomplish substantive ends, there is no reason that
the Erie doctrine should make all of those efforts per se unenforceable
in federal court merely because the state laws can be characterized as
255
conflicting with one of the Federal Rules.
Under Hanna, when a state law conflicts with a Federal Rule, there
are two points of analysis: the conflict-analysis stage of Hanna and the
Rules Enabling Act–validity stage of Sibbach. If a court finds a conflict
under the expansive post–Shady Grove conflict test, the only hope for
enforcement of the state law is if the court finds the Rule to be invalid.
Justice Ginsburg’s preferred method of guarding state interests, expressed in Gasperini and in the Shady Grove dissent, calls for narrowing
the scope of what is considered a conflict at the first stage of Hanna,
thereby channeling more Erie questions into the more state-lawfriendly modified outcome-determination test. However, this policy
could unjustifiably disrupt procedural uniformity in federal court.
Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Shady Grove offers a more modest
approach. Rather than protect federalism by narrowing the range of
cases decided by the federal-law-friendly Sibbach test, Justice Stevens’s
proposal keeps the range of cases exposed to the Sibbach test the same,
but increases the scrutiny of the test. Specifically, Justice Stevens
opined that, under the Rules Enabling Act, a federal court cannot apply a Federal Rule if that application “would displace a state law that is
procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a
254

See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC.
342 (2002) (discussing “procedure as power” in the context of legal training and scholarship); Richard Marcus, Confessions of a Federal “Bureaucrat”: The Possibilities of Perfecting Procedural Reform, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 103, 113 (2007) (acknowledging that “procedure is power”).
255
See WSU Symposium on State Civil Procedure: Transcript Highlights of Panelist Discussions, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 255, 295 (2007) (comments of Professor Stephen Burbank)
(“One of the things that . . . state legislatures have learned is that procedure is power.
And . . . Congress knows the power of those so-called procedural provisions to effect
realization or not of the substance of that legislation. It’s crazy to me—recognizing
that, at least on matters of substantive law, states will always have different views on
some subjects—to think that they would or they should give up the power of procedure to effectuate or not their substantive goals.”).
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state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state256
created right.” As examples of state laws that are so intertwined, Justice Stevens listed the New York law concerning review of damages that

256

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring). Early analysis of Shady
Grove, citing United States v. Marks, claimed that Justice Stevens’s concurrence controlled on this question. See Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Sorting Out an Erie Sequel,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 31, 2010, 1:16 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/
analysis-sorting-out-an-erie-sequel (“Stevens’ view on this general point becomes controlling through the practice of the Court . . . .”). This is incorrect. Marks held that
“[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.’” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). As several courts have recognized, “the Marks rule
is applicable only where one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as narrower than
another and can represent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning.” United
States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anker
Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179,
189 (2d Cir. 2003); A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Massanari, 305 F.3d 226, 236 (4th Cir. 2002);
Anker Energy Corp., 177 F.3d at 170; King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
The opinions in Shady Grove do not indicate that the other Justices share Justice
Stevens’s views on this question. The plurality believed that courts should continue to
evaluate the validity of the Federal Rules under Sibbach, querying whether a Rule “really regulates procedure.” See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.) (“We have held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed
repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon whether it regulates procedure.”). Three of the four Justices in the plurality so strenuously disagreed
with Justice Stevens’s approach that they felt compelled to devote a subsection of their
opinion to criticizing his opinion. Id. at 1444-47 (Scalia, J., for himself, Roberts, C.J.,
and Thomas, J.). Nor can the votes to enact Justice Stevens’s concurrence come from
the dissent. Although one might conjecture that, owing to their apparently greater
concerns about the federalism implications of Hanna, the dissenting Justices might
prefer Justice Stevens’s approach to that of the plurality, the dissent did not address
the issue of how Rules should be evaluated under the Rules Enabling Act. See id. at
1460-73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This is presumably because the dissent would have
resolved the issue by finding no conflict between New York’s statute and Rule 23, thereby channeling the question into the modified outcome-determination test. Therefore, it seems that the Shady Grove Court created no new binding precedent on this
question and Sibbach remains the proper test for determining the validity of a Federal
Rule. See also King, 950 F.2d at 782 (“If applied in situations where the various opinions supporting the judgment are mutually exclusive, Marks will turn a single opinion
that lacks majority support into national law.”); Tristan C. Pelham-Webb, Note, Powelling for Precedent: “Binding” Concurrences, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693, 696 (2009)
(observing that the Marks rule cannot be applied “where the concurring opinion cannot reasonably be described as narrower than its accompanying majority or plurality
opinion,” and suggesting instead that legal principles should only become binding
precedent if there is a majority that supports both the outcome of the case and the rationale supporting it).
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was at issue in Gasperini, statutes of limitations, and burdens of proof.
One drawback of Justice Stevens’s approach is that it appears to allow
as-applied challenges resulting in the subordination of individual Federal Rules in individual cases, thereby undermining uniformity in application of the Rules. Nevertheless, more intense scrutiny of the Rules’
validity appears to be one sensible way to reform the overall Hanna
258
framework to provide greater protection to federalism.
It is also important to observe that Justice Stevens’s proposal
would not rescue certificate of merit statutes in federal court. An inevitable side effect of any framework governing the compromise between procedural uniformity and substantive conformity is that the
closer a given question is to the appointed line of demarcation, the
more harmful the resolution will seem to the interest it adversely affects. In other words, when a state rule is so substantive that it almost,
but ultimately does not, merit enforcement in federal court, federalism will seem particularly aggrieved. Thus the final question to consider is as follows: assuming that some modest reform of Hanna is justified to protect federalism, is it acceptable if that reform does not
sweep so broadly as to compel the enforcement of certificate of merit
statutes in federal court?
The answer to this question is “yes.” Viewing substantively motivated procedural reforms along a spectrum, it is possible to place
them in three broad categories. At one end lie the statutes about
which Justice Stevens was most concerned—namely, those that appear
procedural but are “so intertwined with a state right or remedy that
259
[they] function[] to define the scope of the state-created right.” In
the middle lie statutes that regulate procedure in order to tip the playing field so that a certain substantive result is more or less likely at the
260
At the far end of the specend of a fully adjudicated proceeding.
257

See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring) (asserting that
these three types of laws “are the sorts of rules that one might describe as ‘procedural,’
but they nonetheless define substantive rights”).
258
This approach, of course, enhances the misperception that federalism provided the primary impetus behind the limitations in the Rules Enabling Act. See Burbank, supra note 68, at 1108-13 (demonstrating that separation of powers, not federalism, was the primary motivation behind the limitations in the Rules Enabling Act).
Nevertheless, at this point, the misconception is inextricably tied to the doctrine.
Therefore, to the extent that the courts need to be more protective of federalism, the
limitations in the Rules Enabling Act present an established framework for doing so in
the field of procedure.
259
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
260
These statutes often involve admissibility of evidence or forum shopping. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-3-7 (LexisNexis 2005) (limiting venues in which parties can pursue
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trum lie statutes that seek to regulate litigant behavior, but do not
seek to influence ultimate adjudications (aside from any effect the sta261
tutes have on pressure to settle).
Federal subordination of certificate of merit statutes—laws that
fall into this third category—simply does not represent that great of a
threat to federalism. Aside from slightly reducing the pressure to settle certain suits, certificate of merit statutes have an almost negligible
262
effect on the outcome of individual adjudications.
Instead, their
greater purpose is in the aggregate. By reducing frivolous malpractice
litigation, states hope the statutes will lead to lower malpractice premiums and, ultimately, cheaper health care and greater patient
263
Because the statute’s intent lies not in determining the
access.
scope of the rights or remedies of individual litigants, but rather in its
264
aggregate effect on litigation, allowing a small proportion of cases to
class actions and cases against corporations); CAL GOV’T CODE § 11440.45 (West 2005)
(barring admission of defendant’s sympathy as evidence of liability); see also TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(e) (West Supp. 2009) (requiring a unanimous jury
verdict to award punitive damages).
261
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-214 (2005) (placing a twenty-five million dollar cap on appeal bonds); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 52 (2003) (disallowing inclusion of the specific amount of damages sought in a complaint).
262
See supra text accompanying notes 233-36 (discussing the low probability that the
claim of a plaintiff who is unable to obtain an expert affidavit would survive summary
judgment). This, of course, is not to say that the statutes have no effect at all. For a negative appraisal of the effect of certificate of merit statutes, see Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d
861, 869-70 (Okla. 2006). For a more positive treatment, see Press Release, Office of
Rep. Bart Gordon, Gordon’s Medical Malpractice Reform Embraced by Administration
(Sept. 10, 2009), and Press Release, Admin. Office of Pa. Courts, Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Announces Favorable Trends From Preliminary Data (Mar. 18, 2004).
263
See, e.g., Zeier, 152 P.3d at 869 (“The Oklahoma Legislature implemented the
[certificate of merit statute] for the purpose of implementing reasonable, comprehensive reforms designed to improve the availability of health care services while lowering
the cost of medical liability insurance and ensuring that persons with meritorious injury claims receive fair and adequate compensation.”); Press Release, Office of Rep.
Bart Gordon, supra note 262 (stating that the primary goals of certificate of merit statutes are “to reduce frivolous malpractice lawsuits and encourage doctors to abandon
the practice of defensive medicine”). This Comment takes no position on the efficacy
of these statutes, litigation’s influence on the cost of health care, or the merits of tort
reform in general.
264
For instance, in 2008, plaintiffs filed 1602 medical malpractice suits in Pennsylvania. See Press Release, Admin. Office of Pa. Courts, Latest Medical Malpractice Data
Shows Stable Decline in Number of New Cases and Verdicts tbl.1 (Apr. 9, 2009) (indicating that this figure constituted a forty-one percent decline from the 2000–2002 period). Over the same period, only forty-seven medical malpractice cases were filed in
the federal district courts located in Pennsylvania. See Personal Injury—Medical Malpractice Cases Filed in Pennsylvania Between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2008,
http://dockets.justia.com/search?state=pennsylvania&nos=362&after=2008-01-01&
before=2008-12-31 (last visted Sept. 15, 2010) (listing results of an online docket search).
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proceed in federal court without the certificate requirement will
present minimal disruption to the state’s scheme. One potential concern is that plaintiffs might attempt to attach federal causes of action
to their malpractice claims in order to avoid their state’s certificate
265
requirement. When Hanna requires the subordination of a substantively motivated state law in federal court, federal judges should be
particularly wary of any lawsuits in which the plaintiff has attached a
questionable federal claim or claims to a state cause of action. Under
such circumstances, judges should exercise with alacrity their discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to remand the purely state claims to
266
state court, especially if the federal claims are easily dismissed. The
courts can thus attempt to minimize the effect of forum shopping.
CONCLUSION
As the nation grapples with the costs of health care, doctors, liability insurers, and hospitals will continue to advocate state tort reform as
a method of controlling expenses. Certificate of merit statutes wonderfully illustrate the competing interests at play when federal courts
consider the enforcement of state litigation reforms. In principle, the
Hanna framework establishes a compromise between procedural uniformity and substantive conformity, but the hill is steep for substantively motivated state procedural laws. Applying Hanna faithfully, federal courts should not enforce certificate of merit statutes while exerexercising diversity jurisdiction. Most of the statutes conflict with at
least one Federal Rule, and those that do not are generally not out-

265

See, e.g., Farrell v. A.I. DuPont Hosp. for Children of the Nemours Found., No.
04-3877, 2006 WL 1284947, at *8 n.6 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2006) (allowing nondiverse
plaintiffs to maintain state malpractice claims in federal court even after dismissal of
their federal Rehabilitation Act claims).
266
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (setting forth criteria under which federal courts
may exercise their discretion to dismiss pendent state claims); Green v. Young, No. 030722, 2004 WL 5327170, at *9 (E.D. Va. June 8, 2004) (dismissing plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claims for failure to state a claim and dismissing remaining state claims pursuant to § 1367(c)); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966) (establishing judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity as the guideposts for discretionary exercises of supplemental jurisdiction). See generally 13D
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3567.3 (3d ed.
2008) (providing an overview of § 1367(c)). Such an approach is consistent with other
federal precedent that attempts to prevent litigants from forum shopping to take unfair advantage of the Erie doctrine. See, e.g., Martel v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1247 (1st
Cir. 1993) (declining to predict the expansion of a state law remedy at the request of a
plaintiff who elected to file in federal court).
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come determinative. However, at least until Shady Grove, a majority of
federal courts enforced the statutes anyway.
The same tension that has led federal courts to misapply Hanna is
also visible in the conflicting approaches of Justices Ginsburg and Scalia in Gasperini and Shady Grove. Consideration of that tension reveals
that too great a concern for state policies can have a disastrous effect
on procedural uniformity. But an overly moderate reform of Hanna
might not change the doctrine enough to allow enforcement of certificate of merit statutes in federal court. Ultimately, though, this
emerges as the most sensible solution. State causes of action make up
a large percentage of claims litigants bring in federal court, yet only a
small percentage of claims under any given state cause of action are
brought in federal court. Conformity’s threat to procedure is greater
than uniformity’s threat to substance. In the case of certificate of merit statutes, the claimed benefit is in the aggregate: reduced malpractice premiums, cheaper health care, and greater patient access. Because subordination of the statutes in a small percentage of the cases
should not greatly disrupt the statute’s aggregate goals, nonenforcement seems a small price to pay to maintain the procedural uniformity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

